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                                                          ABSTRACT 
 
SIGNS OF STATUS AND SOCIAL HIERARCHY IN OTTOMAN LEGAL CULTURE 
                                                  (16
th
-18
th
 CENTURIES) 
                                                             Ali Atabey 
                                                           M.A., History 
                                    Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Hülya Canbakal 
                                                  June 2012, x + 104 pages 
 
 
  This study tries to identify signs of status in fatwas of Ottoman şeyhülislams from 
16
th
 to 18
th
 centuries. The main issue problematized in this study is the varying legal status 
of Ottoman individuals according to their moral and socioeconomic status. In order to 
show the link in this respect, various status signs ranging from occupation, to lineage, to 
piety, to knowledge, and to economic status are analyzed throughout the study. In this 
regard, the present study has two broad and interrelated questions on its agenda: how and 
to what extent socioeconomic status was at issue in determining individuals‟ legal status, 
and at what points this relationship between socioeconomic status and legal status 
intermeshed with concerns about the preservation of the social order. The primary sources 
that form the basis of this study are Fetava-yı Ali Efendi, Fetava-yı Feyziye me'an-nukul, 
Fetava-yı Abdurrahim, Behçetü’l-fetava, and Neticetü'l-fetava me'an-nukul. Apart from 
that, a group of fatwas belonging to the two 16
th
-century Ottoman şeyhülislams, namely, 
Zenbilli Ali Efendi and Ebussuud Efendi are also consulted. 
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                                                               ÖZET 
 
OSMANLI HUKUK KÜLTÜRÜNDE SOSYAL HİYERARŞİ VE STATÜ GÖSTERGELERİ 
(16.YY – 18.YY) 
                                                            Ali Atabey 
                                             Tarih Yüksek Lisans Programı 
                                Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hülya Canbakal  
                                               Haziran 2012, x + 104 sayfa 
 
 
  Bu çalışma, 16 ila 18. yüzyıllar arası döneme ait Osmanlı şeyhülislam 
fetvalarında yer alan statü göstergelerini saptamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışmada 
sorunsallaştırılan temel mesele, Osmanlı bireylerinin ahlaki ve sosyoekonomik statülerine 
göre farklılaşan hukuki statüleridir. Çalışma boyunca, bu yöndeki bağlantıyı göstermek 
amacıyla meslek, soy, dindarlık, bilgi ve ekonomik statü gibi bir çok farklı statü göstergesi 
ele alınmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, mevcut çalışma, gündemine iki genel ve bağlantılı soruyu 
almaktadır: Sosyoekonomik statü, bireylerin hukuki statüsünün belirlenmesinde nasıl ve ne 
dereceye kadar rol oynamıştır? Sosyoekonomik statü ile hukuki statü arasındaki bu ilişki 
hangi noktalarda sosyal düzenin korunmasına yönelik kaygılarla kesişmektedir? Bu 
çalışmanın temelini oluşturan birincil kaynaklar şunlardır: Fetava-yı Ali Efendi, Fetava-yı 
Feyziye me'an-nukul, Fetava-yı Abdurrahim, Behçetü’l-fetava ve Neticetü'l-fetava me'an-
nukul. Ayrıca, 16. yüzyıl şeyhülislamları Zenbilli Ali Efendi ve Ebussuud Efendi‟ye ait bir 
grup fetvaya da başvurulmaktadır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
In the present study, I try to identify signs of status in fatwas of Ottoman 
şeyhülislams from 16th to 18th centuries. The main issue problematized in this study is the 
varying legal status of Ottoman individuals according to their socioeconomic status.
1
 In 
order to show the link in this regard, various status signs ranging from occupation, to 
lineage, to piety, to knowledge, and to economic status guide me through the whole 
process. In this regard, the present study has two broad and interrelated questions on its 
agenda: how and to what extent status was at issue in determining individuals‟ legal status, 
and at what points this relationship between socioeconomic status and legal status 
intermeshed with concerns about the preservation of the social order? The possible answers 
to these questions are sought in fatwa compilations, an invaluable source for social history, 
albeit providing a restricted, edited and filtered view of social reality. 
I focus on signs of status in two ways; through the way in which they were included 
in the inquiries, and through the extent to which the tone of muftis‟ answers differs 
according to signs of status presented to them. What is of crucial importance in this regard 
is to find out whether people‟s status mentioned in inquiries caused discrimination in favor 
of or against them in the muftis‟ responses. However, signs of status that are chosen to be 
included in inquiries are important in and of themselves, independently of the responses of 
muftis. Since we accept that fatwas are reflections of social reality, the signs of status the 
                                                             
1
 Lexically, socioeconomic status means an individual's or group's position within a 
hierarchical social structure. Socioeconomic status depends on a combination of 
variables, including occupation, education, income, wealth, and place of residence. 
See, “the definition of socioeconomic status,” Dictionary.com, 2012, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/socioeconomic+status. 
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applicants specified cannot be disregarded. Several questions can help us to understand the 
matter better: why did applicants include certain signs of status but not others? What were 
their motives to use these signs? Why were signs of status used in inquiries and responses 
on legal matters (such as ta’zir, marriage, testimony) rather than fatwas on ibadat (pious 
practices, religious obligations)?  
  In many fatwas, there is no special reference to identities of people in question. 
But in some others, like the ones consulted in this study, various identity components of 
individuals were indicated. Then the question arises as to why identity patterns were 
included in some fatwas and not in others? It would not be far from the truth to argue that 
signs of status were specified in some inquiries by the applicants who thought they would 
able to direct the mufti‟s response in their favor. At other times, when the applicants 
observed no benefit in presenting them, signs of status related to the applicants themselves 
and or opposing parties went unrecorded. In this sense, stating any sign of status in their 
inquiries can be considered as the strategy of the applicants to direct the possible answer of 
the mufti for the better. However, it should also be noted that it was ultimately the muftis 
who provided the wording not the applicants. That is to say, an inquiry posed in non-status-
conscious terms could well be rephrased as a status-conscious inquiry because certain 
issues were bound to be status specific, which the applicant may not be aware of. After all, 
whether preferred to be stated by the applicants or worded in status-conscious terms by the 
muftis, signs of status in fatwas constitute a fruitful avenue to trace the implications of 
social hierarchy in the Ottoman world. 
In the first chapter, it will be argued that legal reliability of individuals was more or 
less determined by their place in social hierarchy. In this regard, fatwa compilations will be 
used in a way to show the link between legal credibility and components of status ranging 
from occupational status to economic status, to knowledge, and to piety. Related to this, it 
will also be argued how important material means were to establish one‟s status as pious, 
thereby qualifying legal credibility. In order to set the stage for the discussion through what 
were reflected in fatwas, the ideas pertaining to social hierachy and social inequalities in 
the writings of the pre-Ottoman Islamic literati and Ottoman literati will be provided. In 
this connection, focusing on the similarities between the anxieties of the Ottoman elite 
writers regarding social mobility and the muftis‟ loyalty to the existing social hierarchy, 
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the elitist character of fatwas will be discussed. Moreover, the findings of sicil-based 
studies will enable us to evaluate further the extent of the overlap between socioeconomic 
status and legal credibility. 
It will be demonstrated in the second chapter that socioeconomic status of 
individuals caused a considerable difference on their legal status. The main discussion will 
be based on the varying ta’zir (discretionary punishment by kadi) punishments according 
to socioeconomic status of offenders. In this connection, fatwas will provide us with a 
comprehensive picture regarding the extent to which socioeconomic status could be 
decisive in the punishments the offenders got. The institutionalized legal privileges of the 
Ottoman world will be shown with reference to three social groups: the Ulama, notables, 
and seyyids. After that, the link between economic status, law, and social order will be 
further evaluated through the implications of seclusion in the Ottoman realm; therefore, the 
focus will be on the term muhaddere (secluded, honorable woman). 
The third chapter will discuss the Islamic principle of equality in marriage (kafā'a) 
and its reflections in the Ottoman realm through the relevant fatwas. After providing a 
thematic picture of kafā'a in pre-Ottoman Islamic law, the main discussion on the Ottoman 
context will take place. Through the selected fatwas of Ottoman şeyhülislams, it will be 
shown to what extent the principle of marriage equality effectively applied in Ottoman 
society. Due to their strong association with social hierarchy, the focus of this chapter will 
rather be on some principles such as occupational status, wealth, lineage, knowledge and 
moral standing while other principles (freedom, religious identity) will only be slightly 
touched upon since they were relatively better determined in the canon of the Islamic law. 
In general, the chapter will have three points on its agenda. At the first stage, it will be 
shown that in reply to the inquiries related to marriage equality, the muftis expressed their 
opinions in favor of the marriages between the partners of same or similar socioeconomic 
status. Parallel to this, it will be argued that the muftis contributed to the maintenance of 
the social order with their sensitivity towards keeping existing differences between social 
groups. Lastly, the conclusions drawn from fatwas will be compared to the findings of the 
sicil-based studies in relation to the marriage patterns in the Ottoman world. 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
A. SOURCES AND LIMITS 
 
 
A.1. Sources 
 
 
The sources consulted in this study are fatwas from sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteen centuries. In simplest terms, fatwa can be defined as the non-binding legal opinion 
of a mufti in reply to the questions posed to him. The primary sources that form the basis 
of this study are El-Muhtarat Minel Fetava (Originally Dated 1525), Fetava-yı Ebussuud 
Efendi (O. Dated 1574), Fetava-yı Ali Efendi (O. dated 1692), Fetava-yı Feyziye me'an-
nukul (O. Dated 1703), Fetava-yı Abdurrahim (O. Dated 1715), Behçetü'l-fetava (O. Dated 
1743), and Neticetü'l-fetava me'an-nukul (O. Dated 1800), all of which are compilations of 
şeyhülislam fatwas.  
I consult fatwas of two muftis from the 16
th
 century: Zenbilli Ali Efendi and 
Ebussuud Efendi. Zembilli, the basket man Ali Cemali Efendi, named after his window-
hung basket in which inquiries were placed, held the office of şeyhülislam for 24 years 
between the years 1502 and 1526, coinciding the reigns of Beyazid II, Selim I, and 
Süleyman I respectively.2 During his period of service, the number of fatwas increased so 
much that he could not keep step with the inquiries. A selection from his countless fatwas 
were collected in an opus named El-Muhtarat Minel Fetava
3
 which I consult in this study. 
The other 16
th
 century source analyzed here is Fetava-yı Ebussuud of the well-known 
Ottoman şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi, best known for his commitment to synthesize 
Ottoman secular law and sharia. Like Zenbilli Ali, Ebussuud Efendi is also reported to 
                                                             
2
 Abdülkadir Altunsu, Osmanlı Şeyhülislamları (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbbası, 1972) 
14-15. 
3
 Halil Inalcık. "Djamali." in E. V. Donzel, B. Lewis, & Ch. Pellat (eds.), EI2, 
(Leiden: Brill, 1997), 420. 
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have issued numerous fatwas, some days as many as 1,413.
4
 Thus, fetvahane, an efficient 
office within the body of the şeyhülislam office, was established under the direction of 
fetva emini, and the fatwa issuance practice was put into more regular and organized basis.
5
 
His fatwas were compiled by his scribes and disciples such as Bozanzade Mahmud b. 
Bozan, Veli Yegan, and Kakülüperişan Şeyhi Efendi. Also, there are various compilations 
attributed to Ebussuud Efendi in various libraries, especially those in İstanbul.6 Apart from 
these, some modern scholars have studied Ebussuud fatwas; among which the study by 
Ertuğrul Düzdağ, including 1001 fatwas of Ebussuud, is the one I consult in this study.7 
The only 17
th
 century source analyzed here is Fetava-yı Ali Efendi which comprises 
more than four thousand fatwas of Çatalcalı Ali Efendi, who occupied the office of 
şeyhülislam between 1674 and 1686 during the time of Mehmed IV. There are two copies 
of this source in Süleymaniye library which were compiled during the lifetime of Çatalcalı 
Ali Efendi in 1689 and 1691 respectively. Having become one of the most popular 
examples of its genre, Fetava-yı Ali Efendi was published more than ten times in 19th and 
early 20
th
 centuries.
8
 The copy which I consult is the one edited by Salih b. Kefevi which is 
composed of two volumes with Arabic original evidences (nakl) placed under each fatwa.
9
 
Among the sources of this study, the ones from 18
th
 century constitute the majority. 
The earliest one of these is Fetava-yı Feyziye of Seyyid Mehmed Feyzullah Efendi, one of 
the most popular Ottoman şeyhülislams. Fetava-yı Feyziye is composed of the fatwas 
issued by Feyzullah Efendi during his period of service in the office of şeyhülislam which 
he occupied two times; after a short period of service in 1688 which resulted with 
dismissal, he was bestowed the office again and kept until his tragic end in 1703. It is 
known that the compilation with some editions was finalized after Feyzullah Efendi‟s 
                                                             
4
 Uriel Heyd, “Some aspects of the Ottoman fetva,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies 32 (1969), 46. 
5
 Heyd, “Some aspects of the Ottoman fetva,” p.  47. 
6
 Cengiz Kallek, “Fetava-yı Ebussuud Efendi”, DİA, 1995, Vol. 12: 441-43. 
7
 M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ, Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk 
Hayatı (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1972). 
8
 Cengiz Kallek, “Fetava-yı Ali Efendi”, DİA, 1995, Vol. 12: 438. 
9
 Çatalcalı Ali Efendi. Fetava-yı Ali Efendi (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1893). 
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death but its editor is still unknown to us. Under the title of Fetava-yı Feyziye maa’n-nukul, 
the compilation was published twice; the first one is in 1850 and the second one is in the 
margins of Fetava-yı AliEfendi in 1906-1907.10 Here I consult the one which was 
published in 1850.
11
 
The second 18
th
 century source which I use is Fetava-yı Abdurrahim of 
Menteşizade Abdurrahim Bursavi Efendi who occupied the office for only one and a half 
year between the years 1715 and 1716. Despite his short period of service, his fatwa 
collection, which is composed of more than eleven thousand fatwas, is the most detailed 
one among the collections published in the 19
th
 century. This published version is 
composed of two volumes and does not refer to original evidences (i.e. quotations from 
earlier muftis) but solely includes the inquiries and Abdurrahim‟s answers to them. Other 
than the copy without original evidences which I consult here
12
, there is also another 
version edited by Gedizli Mehmed Efendi which includes original evidences as well.
13
 
Another source from the 18
th
 century which this study refers to is Behçetü’l-fetava 
of Yenişehirli Abdullah Efendi.14 Yenişehirli Abdullah‟s period of service coincides with 
the so called “tulip period”. Although he did not experience a tragic end as Feyzullah, he 
also lost his position as a result of a rebellion, the 1730 rebellion, aka “Patrona Halil 
rebellion”. Although Yenişehirli‟s fatwas were compiled during his lifetime, it was a 
careless edition as to form and order. As such, Mehmed Fıkhi El-Ayni, who once had 
served Yenişehirli as a scribe, reorganized the compilation. Having added Yenişehirli‟s 
later fatwas and inserting original Arabic evidences below each fatwa, El-Ayni named the 
compilation as Behçetü’l-fetava. The compilation was published two times.15 
                                                             
10
 Salim Öğüt, “Fetava-yı Feyziye”, DİA, 1995, Vol. 12: 443. 
11
 Feyzullah Efendi. Fetava-yı Feyziye me’an-nukul (İstanbul: Darü't-Tıbaati'l- 
Amire, 1850). 
12
 Menteşzade Abdurrahim Efendi. Fetava-yı Abdurrahim (İstanbul: Darü't-Tıbaati'l-
Ma'mure, 1827). 
13
 Cengiz Kallek, “Fetava-yı Abdurrahim”, DİA, 1995, Vol. 12: 437. 
14
 Abdullah Yenişehirli. Behçetü’l-feteva me’an nukul (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 
1849). 
15
 Ahmet Özel, “Behçetü‟l-fetava”, DİA, 1992, Vol 5: 346. 
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The last of the 18
th
 century fatwa compilations forming the basis of this study is 
Neticetü’l-fetava of Dürrizade Mehmed Arif Efendi. As a member of the well-known 
Ulama family Dürrizades whose about forty members occupied various offices in the 
Ottoman Empire, Mehmed Arif Efendi occupied the office of şeyhülislam three times 
between the years 1785 and 1798.
16
 What is unusual about Neticetü’l-fetava is that it does 
not include solely fatwas of Dürrizade Mehmed Arif but is of a collection of fatwas of 
various şeyhülislams occupied the office from 1730 onwards. The compilation was 
published twice in 1821 and 1848
17
, and I consult the latter publication.
18
 
Apart from these sources, I have partly consulted two important primary sources 
which are Fetava-yı Hindiyye and Mülteka’l-ebhur. In this study I depend on the Turkish 
translations of these two works.
19
 Fetava-yı Hindiyye, also known as Feteva-yı 
Alemgiriyye, is an Arabic fatwa book covering opinions pertaining to the Hanafi madhhab. 
At the request of Sultan Aurangzeb Alemgir of Mughal Empire, the book was compiled by 
a group of Indian scholars between 1664 and 1672.
20
 The other source that I have 
consulted is Mülteka’l-Ebhur of Muhammad b. İbrahim Halebi, a renowned Aleppine jurist 
lived during the time Süleyman I. He is known to have written about twenty works. Based 
on the works of famous Hanafi jurists, Mülteka is the most famous one which became a 
part of Ottoman madrasa curriculum and was used as a guidebook among the Ulama of 
later generations.
21
 Unlike the other sources consulted in this study, Mülteka’l-Ebhur is not 
a fatwa compilation but of furu’ (substantive law) genre.  
 
 
 
                                                             
16
 J. R. Walsh, “Dürrizade”, EI2 Vol. 2: 629-30. 
17
 Mehmet İpşirli, “Dürrizade Mehmed Arif Efendi”, DİA, 1994, Vol. 10: 37. 
18
 Neticet’ül-fetâvâ me‘an-nukul (İstanbul, Matbaa-ı Amire, 1849). 
19
 Fetava-yı Hindiyye, Translated by Mustafa Efe. (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları); 
İbrahim el-Halebi, Mülteka’l-Ebhur, Translated by Mustafa Uysal (Istanbul: Çelik 
Yayınları, 1985). 
20
 Ahmet Özel, “el-Alemgiriyye”, DİA, 1989, Vol. 2: 365-66. 
21
 Şükrü Selim Has, “Halebi, İbrahim b. Muhammed, DİA, 1997, Vol 15: 231-32. 
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A.2. Limits 
 
 
Even if one takes their uniqueness in terms of being situated at the intersection of 
legal theory and social practice for granted, and puts aside the fact that most of the 
information provided in fatwas would otherwise have gone unrecorded, studying fatwas for 
social history brings along certain risks and limitations. This is all the more true for fatwas 
forming the basis of this study for reasons that will be specified in what follows. 
We have two different sets of problems related to our sources. First set of problems 
are general problems holding true for any particular fatwa. We have enough reasons to take 
fatwas as products of the interaction between muftis and individuals regarding daily 
matters. However, several restrictions related to the source call for caution about making 
general and superficial interferences, and the most important of these pertains to the ability 
of fatwas in reflecting the social reality accurately. Emphasizing this problem of fatwas as 
a historical source, Imber argues its limits for studying Ottoman social history due to the 
reason that their format deliberately removes legal problems from their social context.
22
 
Related to the matter of the relationship between social reality and fatwas, the question can 
be reversed in the following way: namely, were the legal opinions of the muftis followed in 
reality by the applicants? At least theoretically, fatwas were legally non-binding. In other 
words, neither the individuals nor the judges had to abide by fatwas.
23
 In this regard, we 
should note the possible gaps between the written form of the fatwas and their application 
in practice. That is to say, it is all ambiguous the extent to which the orthodox attitude in 
fatwas was put into practice by the applicants. The possible answers to these questions 
                                                             
22
 Colin Imber, “Women, Marriage, and Property: Mahr in the Behcetü'l-fetava of 
Yenişehirli Abdullah,” in Women in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in 
the Early Modern Era, ed. Madeline Zilfi (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 103. 
23
 However, their non-binding character by no means imply fatwas‟ easy disregard 
by kadis. Once presented to the court, kadis had to have convincing reasons to 
disregard fatwas in their decisions. If they disregarded in an unconvincing way, 
presenters of the fatwa could appeal to the imperial council for annulment, and this 
might leave the kadi in a difficult position. Mehmet Akif Aydın, Türk Hukuk Tarihi 
(İstanbul: Hars Yayıncılık, 2007), 101. It also can be speculated that at least some 
disputes were resolved by consulting fatwas without carrying out the issue into the 
court. Existence of many issues resolved in the family or neighborhood according to 
the rulings taken from muftis are not of a far possibility. 
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would not be more than educated guesses, a limitation that calls for case-based sicil studies 
interpreting and situating the findings from fatwas on a more legitimate ground. Thus, we 
can by no means assume a from end to end overlap between the legal attitude and social 
practice.  
The second set of problems, however, is particularly about the fatwas forming the 
basis of this study. First of all, the fatwas used in this study are from compilations which 
were edited and published in the 19th century rather than the original manuscripts. Thus 
they have been subjected to a selection and reorganization as well as a standardization of 
the editors. Therefore, we have to be careful about drawing general inferences by using 
them. 
Another point, not as a problem but as a caution, needs to be mentioned beforehand 
regarding the broad time frame which the present study deals with. The fatwas forming the 
basis of this study cover a long period of time from the beginning of the 16th to the end of 
the 18th century. The selection of sources, however, was not arbitrary or accidental but 
rather a result of an initial concern to see whether certain changes in the attitude of the 
religious institution could be followed through the fatwas issued by the chief muftis, the 
head of the religious institution in the Ottoman Empire. To be more precise, I initially 
intended to see whether, for instance, the Kadızadeli movement of the 17th century, the 
sociopolitical fluctuations and Islamic revival of the 18th century, or the religious and 
social reflections of the upheavals that resulted from the blurring of social distinctions were 
reflected in fatwas.  
No noticeable change in the attitude of the muftis has been observed. This may lead 
the reader to the impression that the muftis who issued these fatwas were all of the similar 
ideological wings, and that their attitude remained static irrespective of the socioeconomic 
and political transformations that took place during their terms of office. In his book on the 
fatwas of Ebussuud, Düzdağ emphasizes the “timelessness” of fatwas, meaning fatwas 
from different periods, or even different centuries may match verbatim. This is true for the 
fatwas used in this study too; fatwas from different centuries seem to reflect a monolithic 
picture of the Ottoman society considering both the inquiries and the responses to them. At 
this point, it should be noted that this monolithic and static representation of the Ottoman 
society may be misleading.  
10 
 
From late 16th century onwards, Ottoman Empire underwent serious 
transformations in socioeconomic and political realms as well as the legal realm. To start 
with the changes in the legal realm, it should be noted that the relationship between secular 
law and sharia did not remain static. From the 16th century onwards, social practice was 
increasingly integrated into sharia as to form and content. In relation with this, during the 
time of Süleyman I, Ebussuud fashioned the ideal Islamic legal system by means of 
harmonizing the secular law with sharia.
24
 Parallel to this, the importance of sharia 
increased considerably in the politics of Ottoman Empire during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 
centuries.
25
 Together with this dominance of sharia and accordingly the office of the 
şeyhülislam, fatwas‟ importance is also said to increase from the 17th century onwards.26 
The relation between central authority and religious orthodoxy did not remain the 
same either. At certain times religious orthodoxy gathered momentum as in the case of 
Kadızadeli movement and the religious revivalism of the 18th century. Accordingly, as 
evident in the case of clothing regulations, state emphasis on moral issues also changed 
from time to time. Although there are indications that there can be changes in the 
ideological stand of the muftis of different periods, our fatwas do not provide us with 
cogent evidence in this regard. Unfortunately, in Ottoman historiography too the 
reflections of the alterations in central ideology on the content and practice of law are still 
mostly an issue of curiosity. The effects of religious orthodoxy on the ideology and the 
political attitudes of the central elite have only recently started to receive an academic 
interest.
27
 After a long predominance of the received wisdom which considers Kadızadeli 
                                                             
24
 Colin Imber, Ebu’s-suùd: The Islamic Legal Tradition (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997). 
25
 Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in 
the Early Modern World (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
26
 Hülya Canbakal, “Birkaç fetva bir soru, bir hukuk haritasına doğru,” in Şinasi 
Tekin’in anısına: Uygurlardan Osmanlıya, ed. Günay Kut and F. Yılmaz Büyükkarcı 
(İstanbul: Simurg, 2005), 258.                        
27
 Marc D. Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in 
Ottoman Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Khaled El-Rouayheb, 
"The Myth of “the Triumph of Fanaticism” in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman 
Empire." Die Welt Des Islams. 48.2 (2008): 196-221; idem, "Heresy and Sufism in 
11 
 
movement as marginal and of limited effect both in time and space, the recent tendency 
shifted the focus in favor of a more detailed analysis of the effects of religious orthodoxy 
on the ideology of the centre.
28
 
Apart from that, it can be said that Ottoman society experienced notable 
transformations and political turmoil during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries. It has been 
discussed by several scholars and is generally accepted that distinctions among different 
social groups in Ottoman society became blurred during the period in question. Although, 
the concerns related to the preservation of social order have an extensive coverage in other 
genres of Ottoman political literature written by the members of ruling elite, fatwas do not 
represent direct reflections of these socioeconomic transformations; rather, they seem to 
represent a constant orthodoxy. However, this does not rule out the possibility of the 
existence of certain changes in the muftis‟ attitude in accordance with contemporary 
socioeconomic and political issues. In order to come up with an accurate conclusion 
whether fatwas reflect socioeconomic and political changes, a much more detailed cross 
examination based on manuscript fatwas rather than those published in 19th century is 
needed, which exceeds the limits of this study.  
 
 
 
B. STATUS AND INDIVIDUAL IN OTTOMAN HISTORIOGRAHY 
  
 
Various aspects of status in Ottoman society have been subject of Ottoman 
historiography, although there remains a whole lot more work to be done in this regard. 
The sources forming the basis of the relevant literature are mostly from the legal realm. No 
doubt, this is a natural result of the fact that such sources are unique in their ability to 
reveal the interaction between the ruling class and people from any layer of the society. 
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Thus, kadi courts were the institutions “with which for a variety of reasons nearly everyone 
in the Ottoman empire came into contact – Muslims, Jews or Christians, reaya or askeri, 
villagers or urbanites, tribes, visitors from abroad and individuals, as well as groups with 
different professional, religious or social profiles.”29 The main legal sources exploited by 
social historians are court records, estate probates, complaint books, marriage records, and 
partially fatwas. Each serves various purposes of Ottoman historians but each has its own 
particular shortcomings.
30
 
Many historians have exploited court records as a guide to study social history. 
Although the use of the source is not a recent issue but can be dated back to the 1960s-70s, 
the way in which court records are used has changed enormously. Particularly noteworthy 
is the change towards benefitting from court records in a way to examine them with 
reference to the status of the people involved. In conjunction with this change, the Ottoman 
court records have been exploited by the historians in a way to analyze the relationship 
between wealth, prestige, social relations and power on the one hand, and the legal status 
on the other. Through the data extracted from court records, historians try to provide a full 
flesh-and-blood portrait of the surrounding societies. In a sense, such studies have shown 
the variability of justice “according to a person‟s location in the social landscape-by 
gender, by class, by place of residence, by religious orientation.”31 Numerous works can be 
cited in this regard.
32
 However, Marcus‟s study on 18th-century Aleppo, published in 1989, 
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can be regarded as a turning point regarding the use of sicils as a source of social history 
because Marcus used the court records in a way to represent Aleppine society with its 
almost all aspects ranging from social stratification, economy, wealth, power, religion, 
learning, to marriage, social order, public space, and privacy.  
Among other sicil-based studies Canbakal‟s33 and Ergene‟s34 works should be 
singled out due to their emphasis on the link between socioeconomic status and legal 
status, and hence their importance for the present study. What these two sicil-based studies 
have in common is their contribution to show how social hierachy and class differences 
affected operation of the legal process. As a case in point, they argue that members of the 
Ottoman world were well aware of this strong link between legal status and socioeconomic 
status which is evident in their findings from Ayntab, Kastamonu and Çankırı respectively. 
They have shown that there is a marked pattern of people from lower status losing more of 
the lawsuits they filed against people of higher socioeconomic status than it was other way 
around and most of the lawsuits took place between members of the same or similar 
socioeconomic levels. 
Apart from that, related to the link between social hierarchy and legal status, role of 
the local notables has been shown in numerous studies. The relevant studies pointed out 
that the local notables, who acted as agents between center and provinces, seem to have 
had a similar role in court affairs which is evident from many cases in which they were 
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recorded as agents, witnesses, guarantors, or guardians.
35
 Local notables, mostly identified 
through their honorific titles, were among the primary components of the local courts; they 
either performed as regular witnesses in courts by virtue of their „righteousness‟36, or 
served to the courts in different capacities as scribes, muhzir (bailiff), çukadar (footman) 
etc.
37
; Indeed, many officials were chosen by the intervention and confirmation of local 
notables.
38
 It should also be noted that common people, too, could enjoy legal privileges to 
the extent that was allowed by their social ties and networks. In his study on 18
th
 century 
Salonica, Ginio argues that local notables felt the need of intervention in legal cases in 
favor of the litigants affiliated to them by some means or other.
39
 
Through court records, social historians have been able to provide new glimpses 
into the advantages or disadvantages that Ottoman individuals experienced before law 
according to their socioeconomic status. An enormous contribution has come from gender 
studies which analyzed women‟s experiences in the male dominant Ottoman society.40 
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Social historians in gender studies have raised several questions to that effect: to what 
extent women appeared in the courts; how social and legal experiences of women differed 
according to class, place of residence, lineage, religious orientation; what were the most 
common matters in dispute; against whom they brought action and so on. All these 
questions directly or indirectly ended up with new glimpses to the lives of individuals and 
their socioeconomic status.  
Using various sources including probate inventories, title deeds, transactions, 
kitchens accounts etc., social historians have also tried to reveal socioeconomic status of 
the individuals through their properties, personal possessions and consumption patterns. By 
examining individuals‟ possessions, these scholars tried to estimate their economic status, 
class affiliations, religious identity, that is to say, their overall standing in society. In fact, 
Ottoman scholarship‟s interest in consumption and consumption patterns does not go a 
long way back but the study of the issue gained momentum only in the last decade. The 
book edited by Donald Quataert
41
 can be regarded as the pioneering work paving the way 
for further studies. This book was followed by various other studies.
42
 Among many 
others, Suraiya Faroqhi has produced extensively on this subject.
43
 In general, the studies 
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in this regard have shed light on the overlap between people‟s consumption patterns and 
their position in the social hierachy: color and fabric of clothes; size, location, fabric and 
dependencies of dwellings; the patterns related to food and food consumption as well as 
furnishings, all have been taken as reference points by Ottoman historians to identify 
socioeconomic status of individuals in the Ottoman world.  
No doubt, all the studies cited here provide alternative keys to unlock various 
aspects of socioeconomic status of Ottoman individuals. Stated in other words, they all 
give us invaluable insights into the Ottoman world and provide us with new perspectives 
regarding the inequalities, hierarchies, and signs of status embedded in Ottoman society. 
Notwithstanding the momentum that status-related studies have gathered, there is still a 
considerable lack of knowledge about the link between socioeconomic status and legal 
status. Although fatwas provide a very promising source to be consulted in this regard, 
they have not received much academic interest. It is true that court cases too provide a 
basis to study hierarchy-consciousness. However, fatwas may reveal a much more intricate 
hierarchy. Particularly, the issue of morality and detailed hierarchy of occupations are 
nearly impossible to trace throughout the sicils. To the best of my knowledge, while fatwa 
compilations have been exploited to some extent by scholars
44
, they have not been 
analyzed in a way to reveal the signs of social status and social hierachy reflected in them. 
In a sense, the present study can be considered as an attempt to make a contribution in this 
regard. 
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         Chapter I 
    
 
     SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND LEGAL CREDIBILITY 
 
 
 
“When they are brought into court [these] cultural orientations take on an 
aspect at once distinct to the law‟s need for definitive results and the cultural 
propulsion to maintain the room for maneuver that is seen as an inherent aspect 
of social order. The qadi will, in most instances, thus try to determine who a 
person is, not just what happened in the circumstance at issue.”45 
 
 
In this chapter, I will seek to examine whether the suggestions above apply to the 
Ottoman context. To this end, I will deal with the extent to which socioeconomic status of 
individuals had a bearing on their legal credibility. First, I will present a thematic picture of 
testimony in the Islamic law in general terms to set the stage for the main discussion 
related to the Ottoman context. Then, I will present the instances in which social hierarchy 
was reflected in Ottoman fatwas. In this connection, occupational status, knowledge, 
wealth, and moral standing will be evaluated as criteria in assessing legal credibility. 
Throughout the process, the perspectives of pre-Ottoman Islamic literati as well as 
Ottoman literati on the subject in question will be compared with what was reflected in 
fatwas.  
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I.1. Testimony in Islamic Law 
 
 
One of the most important components of the pre-Ottoman Islamic legal evidence 
(bayyina) is testimony (shahada), the others being acknowledgement (ikrar) and the oath 
(yamin).
46
 Although written evidence is also taken into consideration, it remains of 
secondary importance.
47
 Hallaq argues that beginning in the 9th century it became almost a 
universal doctrine that without the support of the testimony of two male witnesses, any 
document or evidence would remain incomplete, failing to constitute proof in court.
48
 
Literally, testimony means certain information.
49
 No doubt the certainty of any news 
is directly proportionate to the reliability of its conveyer. However, the process of 
determining the reliability of a witness was not free from the existing social hierarchy. 
Before going into the details of this association between socioeconomic status and 
eligibility to give legal testimony, a brief discussion of the main principles of testimony in 
pre-Ottoman Islamic law is in order.  
In principle, a witness should be a sane, adult, free, and Muslim. Suits cannot be tried 
unless two males, or one male and two female witnesses are present. As is evident from 
this requirement, two female are equal to one male in giving testimony. As for slaves and 
non-Muslims, they are not entitled to give a legal testimony against or for a Muslim, and 
all schools agreed on this principle with the exception of Hanbalis, who accept slave 
testimony.
50
 Free Muslim men, however, can give testimony in all kinds of cases except 
those involving female body parts such as the cases related to menstruation, childbirth, 
virginity and defects of the female sexual organs.
51
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The credibility of the parties in a suit, especially the witnesses was a major concern. 
Formative period jurists were well aware of the possibility of dishonesty by the parties 
involved in a suit due to concern of personal benefit. Thus there was strong doubt by jurists 
of all four schools concerning the judges‟ ability to distinguish between the right and false 
testimonies. Although judges could be careful, the social reputation of individuals was 
thought to be a more reliable criterion to check witnesses‟ credibility.52 This was in 
keeping with the idea that no other information than that found in the Quran, Sunna and the 
consensus of jurists could be considered indisputable and certain.
53
 
Judges did not engage in investigations; their responsibility did not go beyond 
hearing the litigants, defendants and witnesses. However, a special assistant of the judge, 
the purifier (muzakki), was entrusted with the task of preliminary investigation of 
witnesses‟ social reputation since the end of the eighth century. A lawsuit with the 
testimonies of eye witnesses never arrived at conclusion before the muzakki examined and 
ensured the witnesses‟ credibility.54 No doubt, this practice was a natural consequence of 
the importance attached to oral testimony. However, this procedure was not held 
independently of the existing social hierarchy. Hallaq reports a relevant event from 9th 
century in which a kadı‟s assistant who was responsible for finding reliable witnesses for 
the court was severely criticized on the grounds that he admitted into court the people who 
lacked both social reputation and property such as tailors, grocers, etc.
55
 
Similar to the necessity of witnesses to events or crimes that were tried in courts, 
civil lawsuits were also considered to be events requiring witnesses. From the beginning of 
the 9
th
 century, each town court had its own paid official witnesses, called the shudul ‘adl 
(later shudul hal), composed of „the just witnesses‟ whose social reputation and credibility 
were approved by an examination of the muzakki. Having passed the moral test and their 
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names having been recorded officially, the just witnesses functioned in a way to check the 
fairness of the judges‟ rulings.56 
Parallel to the importance attached to social reputation, social hierarchy was reflected 
considerably in legal process. In theory, Islamic legal required all Muslims to be just 
regardless of their socioeconomic status. In practice, however, it seems that this all 
inclusive legal notion made concessions to power holders and wealthy people, and these 
concessions were institutionalized as they became an integral part of the legal theory, as 
evident in the statute books and fatwa compilations. In what follows, I will turn to the 
Ottoman world and discuss whether Ottoman fatwas conform to what we know about pre-
Ottoman Islamic law. I will try to position my discussion to a firmer ground by using 
related examples from Ottoman fatwa compilations.  
 
 
 
I.2. Occupational Hierarchy and Legal Status 
 
 
“The chief element which conditioned stratification in the traditional social 
estates was occupation. Individuals were assigned roles, positions, status and 
prestige in an estate, and the hierarchical order between estates as determined 
by occupation and not property or wealth. It is interesting to note that most 
Muslim social thinkers regarded occupation as the chief determinant of social 
ranking, and even individual character, rather than blood ties; except, of 
course, for the Prophet‟s family and in some cases the members of a 
dynasty”.57 
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As the lines above clearly argue, occupational status could not be explained solely in 
economic terms; instead, it was a sociocultural phenomenon through which social positions 
of individuals were determined. Taking for granted the regional variations in terms of the 
prestige and moral status attached to a certain occupation, it is almost impossible to 
imagine any occupation free from standards of judgments of society. This being said, 
occupation played a crucial role in establishing a person‟s identity not only in Ottoman or 
Islamic context that we deal with here in detail but elsewhere too. As a main source of 
social stratification and inequalities, occupational status profoundly affected individuals‟ 
legal status. A vital link was assumed by societies to be between the social reputation of 
professions and their practitioners‟‟ degree of reliability. Before proceeding to the Ottoman 
context, a brief account of classical Islamic literature on occupational status is in order. 
 
 
 
I.2.1. Occupational hierarchy in the Islamic Culture 
 
 
Occupational status had been an issue of extensive discussion in Islamic-Arabic 
literature of which I will present only a selective but rather representative part in the hope 
of setting up a substructure for the main discussion. In their works, many Muslim scholars 
provided a social model in which the existence of different occupations was regarded as an 
inevitable requirement posed by the needs of any society. In other words, simply because 
no man on his own could be master of all crafts or works, specialization was thought to be 
required. Thus, practitioners of crafts depended on each other in satisfying their needs, and 
due to this interdependence, the importance of each craft was accepted. Among many 
similar ones, Al-Ghazali seems to have expressed his ideas more eloquently regarding the 
need of specialization and cooperation: 
 
“The farmer produces grain, the miller converts it into flour, the baker prepares bread 
from the flour. Further, the blacksmith makes the tools for farmer‟s cultivation, and 
the manufactures the tools needed by the blacksmith. The same goes for all those who 
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engage in the production of tools and equipment needed for production of 
foodstuffs.”58 
 
The practical side of the occupational division aside, what is rather material to our 
discussion is the link between one‟s occupational status and his position in the social 
hierarchy which Muslim thinkers propose. Discrimination towards base occupations is 
quite commonplace, albeit from different perspectives, in the writings of the circles of 
literati, religious scholars and philosophers. The main axis of discrimination was defined 
according to the extent to which an occupation required rational capacity; thus, occupations 
were divided into three main categories: idea-generating occupations (sina’at fikr) action-
generating ones (sina’at ‘amal), and those that require a combination of thought and action 
(sina’a mushtarika bayn al-fikr wa’l-‘amal).59 
Parallel to this division, thought-required occupations get the edge over the others, 
thus the rulers and the philosophers were ranked at the top of the hierarchy.
60
 As opposed 
to the mental effort-requiring occupations which were held in highest esteem, the base 
occupations were placed at the bottom of social hierarchy of the Muslim thinkers, and their 
practitioners were regarded to be of lower moral status, and even as the worst people in 
society as in the account of Al-Mawardi.
61
 Although their indispensability was not 
underestimated, the strong tendency seems to have been in favor of a negative link between 
base occupations and the value attached to them. For instance, in the view of Ikhwān al-
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Ṣafāʾ62, the garbage men‟s services were vital for the well-being of city, and as such, more 
important than perfumery, default of which does not harm the city as much as the default 
of garbage men would.
63
 However, they also argue that inequality among people is normal 
since they differ in intellectual and moral capacity.
64
 Al-Jahiz (d. 868) exemplifies such a 
tendency. He states that “every cupper on earth, regardless of their race (jins) and the 
region from which he originates, loves wine; in the same way, rag-sellers, fishmongers, 
cattle dealers and weavers are in all cases the worst of god‟s creation when it comes to the 
conclusion of contracts and transactions”.65 Even a prophetic hadith is reported on the 
moral corruption of cuppers and weavers, saying that “men are equal, except for the 
weaver and the cupper”.66 
The contempt for base occupations carved a niche for itself in the accounts of very 
prominent Muslim thinkers such as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1274), Al-Jahiz (d. 868), Al-
Ghazali
67
, Ibn Khaldun
68
  and so on. The most detailed and representative account in this 
regard is that of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1274) who divides base occupations into further 
categories with common negative connotations attributed to them, albeit from different 
angles: For example, the practitioners of the occupations which are repugnant to general 
welfare such as practicing a monopoly or sorcery are included in the first sub-category. 
The occupations in the second sub-category included tomfoolery, gambling and minstrelsy, 
which are considered to potentially destroy virtue. Comprised of the occupations such as 
tanning, cupping and street-sweeping, the last sub-category of base occupations has as its 
major characteristic on the repugnance to human nature.
69
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With all this being said, although the Arabic-Islamic literature on occupations is of 
great importance to understand the mentality and sociocultural realities of its time, the 
identity of the writers should be noted. The writers of the works on labour and occupation 
were most of the time among the better-off people.
70
 The issue of writer‟s identity is 
important to understand how the elites positioned themselves vis-a-vis common people, 
which was at issue in the case of Ottoman thinkers too as will be seen in detail below. 
 
 
 
I.2.2. Occupational Status in Ottoman World 
 
  
I.2.2.1. Ottoman Thinkers and Occupational Hierarchy 
 
 
The breaking down of the boundaries between elites and the common people, and a 
dislike for this situation in no uncertain terms, was among main themes repeated by 
Ottoman nasihatname writers from the 16th century onwards. It is immaterial to our 
discussion whether these points were the reflections of reality, an issue on which an 
extensive literature is available.
71
 What matters for us is the way in which the concerns of 
Ottoman elites are reflected. At the core of the social model that the writers praised was a 
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profession-based stratification. Adapting the social model that had been mentioned by 
many Muslim thinkers prior to the Ottoman period, Ottoman writers described the Ottoman 
world based on a social model composed of four main classes (Erkan-ı Erbaa): the men of 
the pen, the men of the sword, the tradesmen, and the agriculturalists.
72
 The safety of the 
world order (Nizam-ı alem) was said to be based on the balance between and among these 
four classes. In order to avoid the danger of the breakdown of this balance, members of 
each layer were expected and encouraged to act in conformity with the certain dressing and 
behavior patterns that were traditionally associated with their position. Based on such a 
rigid division, this model limited chances for mobility.  
I would like to cite briefly the most famous examples of this trend in the hope of 
giving an idea regarding how tightly connected occupation and personal status were in the 
perception of Ottoman elite writers. In his famous and repeatedly-cited epistle, the 
Ottoman statesman Koçi Bey, complains about the same situation and attributes a pivotal 
role to the disturbed balance between social layers in explaining the main problems of the 
time. Comparing the social and political affairs of his time with those of Süleyman I‟s 
“golden” age, Koçi bey draws attention to the unjust appointments due to bribery and 
nepotism rather than merit. In contrast to the time of Süleyman, Koçi bey argues, the 
governors are recruited from the ranks of the ruled in relation to the disturbed balance 
between the four classes.
73
 
Having much in common in their complaints and criticism towards the system, two 
important works preceding Koçi bey‟s epistle are worth mentioning. In his famous treatise 
Nasihatu's Selatin, Mustafa „Ali argues that there is a general „decline‟ which he explains 
with the breakdown of the traditional balance between the four classes. On the one hand he 
complains about the shifts within the lower classes, especially the peasant reaya‟s 
migration to the cities, where they joined the ranks of the artisans and stopped paying 
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taxes, and on the other, he heavily criticizes the unjust appointments to high offices, among 
which he emphasizes the inadequacy of the scribes, most probably due to his personal 
disappointment at failing to follow a scribal career.
74
 Hasan Kafi‟s point of view did not 
differ considerably; the same four classes were repeated, and the maintenance of the world 
order was said to require each person‟s remaining within and acting according to his class. 
The people had to be treated in a manner consistent with their classes; otherwise the world 
order would become damaged.
75
 As for sane people with legal capacity who did not fit into 
any of these four classes, Kafi makes a striking remark which he attributes to “some 
philosophers” without naming them. According to him, outcasts should be forcibly 
incorporated into the existing four classes; otherwise they could be killed since they were a 
burden on the members of the four groups.
76
 This interesting and striking point further 
emphasizes the importance that Ottoman thinkers attached to preserving the social order. 
The well-known 16
th
-century Ottoman moralist Kınalızade Ali provides us with a 
more systematic and philosophical explanation for the four-classed social model. His 
perception of the ideal society is based on a practical division of labor which requires 
mutual help and expects everyone to practice the occupations that they are good at. 
Therefore, the boundaries between the four layers should be maintained and members of 
each layer should be kept in their original places for the safety of the world order. 
However, as Tezcan argues, there are significant reasons to suspect the presence of reasons 
other than practical reasons behind the strong emphasis on the four-classed system they 
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argue.
77
 In conjunction with the identity of the writers, this model was a reflection of the 
elitist way of thinking. The four-classed social model was not solely the reflection of a 
basic need for division of labor for the sake of efficiency but it also marked the thick lines 
between the elites and the common people. Thus, what frightened Ottoman writers were 
the attempts by the common people to change their life for the better in a way by adopting 
so called elite patterns of life. In one of the earliest examples of Ottoman Nasihatname 
literature, for instance, Lütfi Pasha takes a strong dislike against social mobility: he says 
that the subjects (ra’iyyet) should not be indulgent. If they find a way of entering the ranks 
of soldiers (sipahi) or the learned men (ulema), they should not patronize their relatives; 
they can acquire wealth which cannot be prevented and means no harm for the safety of 
order; however, they should be prevented from reaching the level of soldiers in terms of 
apparel, horse and property. These distinctions are required to keep the existing boundaries 
between the social layers.
78
 
Matching occupations with a social value, Kınalızade signals the ideological 
foundations of social stratification in the Ottoman world. Similar to those of some Muslim 
scholars cited before, Kınalızade Ali‟s model divides crafts into three in a hierarchical 
order; honorable crafts, mid-range crafts, and base crafts. Their activities requiring a 
considerable use of reason, the rulers, viziers, philosophers and soldiers are regarded as 
members of the first category, and are accordingly the most honorable members of the 
society. No contempt or honour is attached to the mid-range crafts which include two 
categories, namely, indispensable activities such as agriculture, and dispensable activities 
such as goldsmithery. The most detailed category of Kınalızade‟s model is the base 
activities which had three further categories within: the ones harmful to the social order 
such as pimping, profiteering, tale bearing and banditry; the ones repugnant to the grace of 
humankind such as buffoonery and entertainers; and at the bottommost are the ones 
repugnant to human nature such as astrology, cupping and tanning.
79
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As the given references suggest, the ideal social model of the Ottoman thinkers was 
completely based on social stratification. Any deviation from this model was considered 
repugnant to justice. Telling enough, in the dictionary, the meaning of the term ‘adl 
(justice) was stated as „keeping things in their proper place‟80, and the term zulm, which is 
the exact opposite of “justice”, was defined as „putting things to different places‟.81 In view 
of such a connection between justice and preservation of the world order based on social 
stratification, it does not come as surprise to see that the reliability of witnesses was 
determined according to their social class and profession, which were indissociable.   
 
 
 
I.2.2.2. Occupational Status and Legal Credibility in Ottoman Fatwa Compilations 
 
 
 Regarding occupational status, our findings in fatwas need to be treated from 
different perspectives. Firstly, when we look at them from the perspective of muftis, our 
findings do not conform to the contempt for base occupations by Muslim thinkers. 
Considering our sources, it seems that the practitioners of base occupations were regarded 
legitimate witnesses, provided they were qualified in terms of justness. In Fetava-yı 
Hindiyye there is no discrimination in legal status on the basis of profession: the queries 
related to the legal liability of people of lower status professions such as garbage man, 
sweepers, porters and practitioners of cupping were replied in a way to confirm their 
testimony provided that they were just.
82
 Ibn Abidin, too, argued for assessing people on 
the basis of justness rather than occupation, and rejected an automatic discrimination of the 
practitioners of tanning, weaving, sweeping and cupping.
83
 The fatwa below taken from 
Fetava-yı Feyziye similarly takes the justness as base rather than occupation in assessing 
legal credibility: 
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Is the porter Zeyd eligible to give a legal testimony? Answer: Yes, if he is just.
84
 
 
 
Since they were the members of the ruling elite, the muftis‟ major concern seems to 
be the moral aspect of occupations. Under no condition did they approve the credibility of 
people who earned their livelihood from ill-reputed occupations. The people whose 
professions were religiously forbidden, and traditionally regarded as harmful to the social 
order, were excluded from the muftis‟ pool of just witnesses. This sensitivity of the muftis 
is not surprising, given that they were members of   the ruling class, and in a sense 
responsible for safeguarding the social order. Related to their bad reputation and the social 
contempt attached to them, some occupations were subjected to the close surveillance by 
the state. Acting with suspicion towards occupations of ill repute such as the brokers and 
slave-dealers, the state resorted to the surety system which held responsible the members 
of these occupations for checking one another‟s behavior.85 
Included among them were entertainers who were morally suspected and held with a 
strong contempt in the fatwa compilations. According to Ibn Abidin, practicing singing as 
profession for money was religiously forbidden, thus violating the right of giving legal 
testimony.
86
 Taking a negative attitude towards them, Ibn Kemal included the jugglers and 
instrument players in the category of unreliable witnesses by profession.
87
 Mostly caused 
by the moral concerns which regarded male dancing as an activity going hand in hand with 
sodomy and alcohol consumption, male dancers also lost their legal credibility as far as the 
related fatwas concerned: 
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Would the testimony of Zeyd, who is a dancer dancing in gatherings, be valid? 
Answer: It would not.
88
 
 
Given that Zeyd plays tambour and dances in certain places, would his wife Hind get 
automatically divorced? Answer: She would not if Zeyd does not consider his 
activities as halal, but he should be prevented from doing so by heavy discretionary 
punishment and torture.
89
 
 
 
The practitioners of brokerage (dellallık) were among the less prestigious and much 
suspected members of the Ottoman world. A strong hostility and mistrustfulness was 
vocalized against them both in literary accounts and fatwa compilations. For instance, the 
writer of the Surname-i Humayun, the visual book for 1582 circumcision festivity, 
criticizes the public criers for the reason that they are “greedy for money, blindly seeking 
profit, auctioning off even their property before their death and not opening their mouths 
without demanding money”.90 The Muftis were frequently asked for a ruling regarding 
brokers‟ legal credibility. Whatever the reason of this frequency, it is certain that some 
applicants were troubled with the testimony of brokers in their cases. Muftis in return seem 
to be equally negative, at least doubtful, about the eligibility of brokers: some responses 
are negative while some others have the initial phrase of “if they are just”. While they are 
considered to be liars who mislead people in order to sell his goods, thus not deemed 
eligible to give legal testimony by Ibn Abidin
91
 and Ibn Kemal,
92
 it is only Fetava-yı 
Feyziye which does not automatically reject the broker testimony: 
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Would the public crier Zeyd‟s legal testimony be valid? Answer: It would if he is 
just.
93
 
 
 
When we look at from the perspective of the applicants, however, it seems that 
occupational status mattered considerably in assessing one‟s credibility. Regardless of the 
tone of the muftis‟ answers, frequency of such inquires questioning reliability through 
occupational status is valuable enough in itself. A look at frequently-cited occupations 
whose practitioners‟ credibility was questioned, one realizes the common aspect of these 
occupations is their being at the bottom of social hierarchy. Irrespective of whether the 
applicant was plaintiff or defendant, it is certain that occupational status of witnesses could 
be apple of discord between the opponent parties in a suit. A point which I would like to 
highlight is the question of why the applicants felt the need to present the occupational 
status of witnesses in their inquiries. This is important because we have many other fatwas 
related to witness credibility in which no indication of occupational status is present; 
instead the applicant simply inform the mufti about justness or unjustness of the witness in 
question. This suggests that occupational status of witnesses were presented only when 
lower status occupations were at hand. 
When we look at from the perspective of inquiries, a second point strikes the eye that 
the credibility of court officials was questioned as frequently as that of the practitioners of 
lower status occupations. Considering the court officials, it is almost clear that the fear of 
corruption annoyed the applicants of such queries. In other words, court officials were 
thought to have means to direct the legal process in favor of the opposing party. In addition 
to this, it is also argued by several scholars that court officials were from among the 
notable people, at least affiliated to them, besides the direct intervention of notables to the 
selection and appointment process of court officials, especially in the provinces.
94
 This 
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signifies the extent to which the court officials were placed at the heart of power relations, 
thereby occurring utterances regarding their credibility.  
 
Would the testimony of the court bailiff (muhzır) Amr be valid in Zeyd‟s case? 
Answer: It would.
95
 
Would the testimony of the court clerk Amr be valid in Zeyd‟s case? Answer: It 
would.
96
 
When the court guard (çavuş) Bekir, who is just, gives testimony in a certain case 
which Zeyd and Amr involved in as opponent parties, can Amr refuse Bekir‟s 
testimony on the grounds that he is court guard? Answer: He cannot.
97
 
 
 
 
I.3. Knowledge-Based Division: Alim and Cahil 
 
 
As a key to understand many points pivotal to this study, the sharp contrast between 
the high culture to which the elites belonged and the low culture attributed to common 
people by elite writers needs to be mentioned. Both the cited works of the Ottoman 
thinkers and the fatwa compilations are replete with the terms ‘alim (learned men) and 
cahil (ignorant). Having brought into question in almost all spheres of everyday life 
ranging from legal to marital and to professional affairs, intellectual capacity and 
knowledge seems to be one of the main markers of difference between the two main social 
groups in the Ottoman world, namely, al-khawass (special people) and al-'awamm 
(ordinary people). As Messick argues such a division opposes to the egalitarian discourse 
of the sharia which has a strong emphasis on a collective, shared, and undivided Muslim 
community as evident in constructs such as “the notion of umma, the community of 
Muslims; the „ibad, the believers; and al-Muslimin, the Muslims, as well as in the 
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institution of the mosque, locus of collective gathering for prayers led by a layperson 
(known as an imam)”.98 
In social perception, what was meant by “knowledge” was a good comprehension 
of Islamic culture, history, and religious sciences. In one sense, the emphasis on knowledge 
provided a sophisticated explanation for social inequalities because culturally the need of 
learning was assumed to be a religious duty, expected from and exhorted to anyone 
regardless of socioeconomic means. Knowledge was considered on such a preferential 
basis that even women, whose public appearance had always been approached with caution 
and limited to the exceptional cases, were pardoned when they went out for demanding 
knowledge since their husbands were ignorant.
99
 In the view of Ottoman moralists, there 
were three kinds of people; the learned, the learners, and the ones who were like a fly 
which generally settled on the faces of the animals such as sheep and goat.
100
 
The muftis‟ ruling was in favor of the veneration of knowledge and knowledgeable 
everywhere, including within family: while they were told to treat their children equally, 
the fathers were encouraged to hold their learned children in the highest esteem and treat 
them better.
101
 In tandem with this, the mufti ruled in favor of the studying children‟s being 
supported by their families even after reaching adulthood.
102
 
Thus, a vital role was attributed to knowledge and it was decisive in establishing a 
person‟s social status. As such, fatwas prove a strong consciousness towards assuming an 
inextricable link between the witnesses‟ degree of religious knowledge and their justice: 
Given that when the judge asked about the terms and conditions of Islam the witnesses 
knew its terms and conditions but did not know the kunut prayer and the similar ones, 
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would their testimony be valid? Answer: It would be if they are just.
103
 Would the 
testimony of Zeyd and Amr who do not know main principles of Islam be valid? 
Answer: It would not.
104
 
Given that Zeyd is a man knowing none of the obligatory, necessary and Sunna 
aspects of the prayer, performing the prayer negligently, not knowing the worship and 
its reward, engaging in tittle tattle, eating publicly, and not having justice, would his 
testimony be valid? Answer: It would not.
105
 
Would the testimony of Zeyd who does not know the principles of Islam be valid? 
Answer: It would not.
106
 
This emphasis on knowledge served as a legitimate ground to justify the existing 
social hierarchy; ignorance and the lower classes were strongly associated with each other 
while the upper classes‟ position was ideologically vindicated. It can be said that 
emphasizing the dichotomy between the elite and lower classes, that is to say knowledge 
versus ignorance, to a degree served naturalization of social stratification. In the models of 
professional hierarchy mentioned by jurists and thinkers, the common feature of the top 
professions was expressed as their being done by means of intellectual capacity rather than 
by manual work. For the same reason, the special status attached to the Ulama as the heirs 
of the Prophet was among the themes kept repeated in medieval Islamic literature.
107
 By 
taking advantage of the value that Islamic culture set on knowledge, and posing their own 
world perception in their writings, the Ottoman literati unsurprisingly allocated a highly-
prestigious seat to themselves. They expected the respect of the ignorant, common people. 
The following lengthy quotation from Mustafa Ali clearly demonstrates the primary 
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importance attached to learned men, even vis-a-vis another elite position, on the one hand, 
and the overlap between ignorance and common people from the perspective of an elite on 
the other:  
 
“According to this humble one, on the other hand, to give precedence to the pen is [for 
the following reasons] an obvious conclusion. First, in the a‟la-„i „iliyyin, the highest 
heaven and the supreme sphere, where the divine ordinance and secrets of faith arose, 
the Tablet and the Pen were present, while the firm sword was not. Second, it was at 
all times manifest that, in the hands of those who write, the sword was that which 
serves the pen. [These] I argue, brought auspiciousness of the pen, ultimately, it is 
impoverished and overwhelmingly destitute. And if the pen does not gain the service 
of the sword, its connection to the excellence of knowledge and virtue is hidden. As 
such, because the pen is the spigot of the pleasant waters of knowledge, and because, 
in essence, the sword usually finds fame amongst the commoners and the ignorant, it 
is again the pen, in my opinion, that deserves precedence”.108 
 
 
This being said, Kınalızade Ali‟s statement comes as no surprise; he says that an 
authority is needed to preserve the social order, which was under threat of being harmed by 
the self-interests of people, “especially the common people whose appetites are not well-
refined and are marked by evil”.109 The content and emphasis in such texts cannot be 
assessed in itself regardless of the identity of its author and the context in which they 
appeared. For the same reason, the emphasis on the preservation of the world order in the 
texts at hand was caused in no small part by their authors‟ social identities, including the 
fatwa-issuing muftis. According to a fatwa from Zembilli Ali Efendi, the dichotomy of 
‘alim and cahil takes center stage; having this dichotomy in mind, Zembilli considers 
normal the mistakes that common people make in reading some suras during prayer for the 
reason that they are ignorant.
110
 
According to Ibn Abidin, the testimony of an ignorant against a learned man was not 
admissible on the grounds that by shirking his responsibility to learn the main principles of 
Islam the ignorant had become dissolute. By the same token, the judge had the right to 
decline such peoples‟ right to give legal testimony. Diametrically opposed to the definition 
of the ignorant, the learned man was assumed to grasp the meaning of the complex 
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statements (terkib), to comment on various matters, and to search for the truth.
111
 Unlike 
Ibn Abidin, Ali Efendi did not express an opinion in favor of the invalidity of an ignorant‟s 
testimony against a learned men. Nevertheless, the inquiries are noteworthy in themselves 
presenting us the awareness of sociocultural and economic differences and how these 
differences were somehow incorporated into legal processes, thus giving us a chance to 
access their mentalities to the degree possible. 
 
Can Amr, one of the Ulama, reject Zeyd‟s testimony against him on the grounds that 
Zeyd is not from the Ulama? Answer: He cannot.
112
 
Would the testimony of the ignorant Zeyd, who is just, be valid on the learned Amr 
regarding an issue? Answer: It would.
113
 
 
These two fatwas are important in terms of their ability to show the dichotomy 
between learned men and common people. Although the muftis‟ rulings were not in line 
with the demands of the members of the Ulama, the demands are valuable in themselves: 
in one sense social hierarchy matters here; the members of the Ulama look askance at the 
testimonies of people who were not in the same status with them. 
 
 
 
I.4. Piety, Morality, and Legal Status: Who was just (Adil)? 
 
 
Other than occupational status and knowledge, two other main criteria were used by 
muftis in assessing witness reliability; namely, being pious (fulfilling the religious duties) 
and being moral (avoiding morally disapproved acts). In the first category, the most 
frequently referred religious duty was the daily prayers which, Ebussuud proposed, should 
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be performed under any circumstances;
114
 and failing to do that would obviously result in 
losing credibility to a give legal testimony.  
 
Would Zeyd who got into the habit of not performing the daily prayer be eligible to 
give legal testimony? Answer: He would not.
115
 
Can a worker and someone who does not perform the daily prayers be considered just? 
Answer: Never. Anyone who considers such a person as just should be dreaded.
116
 
 
In the last fatwa, the connected use of worker and someone who did not perform 
daily worship also strikes the eye. Interestingly, neither the applicant nor the mufti makes 
any distinction between them although they point to two completely different aspects of 
status; that is, while worker symbolizes occupational status, not performing daily worship 
has to do with moral status. In that sense, this fatwa supports the assumption that people of 
lower socioeconomic status could easily be associated with immorality or impiety.  
Like the principle regarding the daily prayers, anyone who did not attend three 
Friday prayers was considered dissolute. Exceptions of this rule were people with 
disabilities, people living away from a city, and people who did not attend prayers due to 
the dissoluteness of their imam.
117
 No other reasons were tolerated; a reliable Muslim had 
to give priority to prayers, including the Friday prayers, over everything. 
 
Would Zeyd‟s testimony be valid if he undertakes trade on Friday instead of attending 
the Friday prayer? It would not if he is unjust.
118
 
 
Despite of this rigorous link between justness and performing religious duties, 
performing religious duties regularly was not simply a matter of piety. Related to religious 
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duties, it is crucial for our purposes to note the direct link between certain types of wealth 
and performing religious duties. In other words, establishing one‟s status as pious could be 
strongly related with financial means. Putting aside the religious obligations such as 
pilgrimage and alms which could not be possible without economic capital and hence were 
required of who could afford them, some other basic obligations including daily prayers 
were also related to wealth. According to a fatwa, a person working for someone should 
not attend the Friday prayers in order not to prevent his patron‟s profit. Similarly, fasting 
should also be renounced since it could lead in turn to performance decline for 
employees.
119
 Considering the social reputation that these prayers provided to their 
practitioners on the one hand, and the money and free time required to perform some of the 
religious obligations on the other, we are led to conclude that wealth and property created 
more opportunities to engage in socially prestigious acts such as performing prayers 
regularly, or doing charity works etc., and consequently, to be socially persona grata.  
Apart from performing prayers, there are many behaviors which were considered 
socially and morally deviant by the muftis: playing games such as backgammon, chess, as 
well as the games of ring, tray, and egg; playing and performing music; pigeon-breeding 
all these acts associated with immorality, thereby violating justness. Accordingly, the 
people who failed at performing religious duties, or engaged in such morally-suspected 
acts were considered dissolute, thus ineligible to give legal testimony. However, the matter 
of dissoluteness was not free from social hierarchy. Related to this, Fetava-yı Hindiyye 
comes up with a striking report from Abu Yusuf (d. 798), a notable Hanafi jurist, that if the 
dissolute man is a person holding a notable position in the society, his testimony is valid.
120
 
In this connection, it is not coincidental that we do not encounter with any cases in which 
wealthy people are accused of being immoral (fasık) or impious (facir), a point confirming 
that wealth and nobility are the criteria that somehow automatically generated reliability.  
In terms of its relationship with social hierarchy, we should note another aspect of 
the link between the concerns regarding the maintenance of the social order and the issue 
of adl. The crucial question in this regard is who was responsible for the maintenance of 
the social order. For instance, who was consulted when establishing a witness‟s morality or 
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immorality? The relevant studies from the secondary literature show how social hierarchy 
mattered in this regard. In several studies, we are informed that elites served a decisive 
function in the courts as reliable witnesses, or as the agencies consulted about moral 
standing of offenders or prospective witnesses. Regarding pre-Ottoman Islamic judicial 
process, we learn from Hallaq that witnesses were from well-off social groups whose 
social prestige and reliability went hand in hand.
121
 As for the Ottoman context, among 
many similar studies, Canbakal and Ergene are the ones who most clearly addressed that 
elites nearly monopolized adl witnesses‟ pool in the courts in addition to the various 
official court services they engaged in.
122
 As another aspect of the link between 
socioeconomic status and reliability, Rafeq points to the role that the notables of played in 
determining moral status of neighborhood inhabitants through the example of 18th century 
Damascus
123
 He shows that the people who combated against “evil-doers” were mostly 
from the higher echelons of society. These examples suggest that by virtue of their 
socioeconomic status, elites not only could establish their status as reliable but also were 
closely involved with assessing moral status of other people. In a sense, they were 
responsible for safeguarding the social order while people of lower status were kept under 
control with regard to the possible danger they could create for the safety of the order from 
the elite perspective. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Fatwas suggest that the elite certainly enjoyed special privileges before the law. In 
other words, the legal credibility of wealthy people was a self-appointed phenomenon 
which was created by virtue of their status. Standing in stark contrast to the self-evident 
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rectitude of elites, the people of lower socioeconomic status frequently went through a 
moral and social test whose measures were mostly reflections of elites‟ way of thinking. 
Thus, what someone needed to qualify for legal credibility was not only good moral 
standing but also a good position in the socioeconomic hierarchy. The two antagonisms, 
one between alim and cahil, and the other between upper status occupations and base 
occupations, which occur frequently in fatwa compilations, seem to support the 
relationship between status and reliability in sociocultural perception. 
Reflecting such a perception, the emphasis on preservation of the social order on the 
one hand, and the contempt for the common people and practitioners of base occupations 
seem to have gone hand in hand in fatwa compilations and the literature examined. In other 
words, while the boundaries between various social classes and indispensability of base 
occupations were thought to be essential for the safety of social order, immorality and 
ignorance were attributed to the lower classes in a way legitimizing the compartmentalized 
social model. 
Thus the identity of the writers emphasizing social order and attributing inferiority to 
the lower classes is important to understand the whole discussion on socioeconomic status 
and legal credibility. However, it should also be noted that awareness of socioeconomic 
status was not specific to upper classes; instead, the common people could also present a 
similar consciousness since they shared the same cultural horizons with the upper classes, 
though located on its two opposite sides. Thus we can assume that common people‟ 
perception of justice and their attitude towards social stratification and the safety of social 
order did not differ much from that of upper classes, an issue which will be further 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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               Chapter II 
 
 
   TA’ZİR AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
 
 
 
 
II.1. Taz’ir in the Islamic Law 
 
 
In general, there are three types of crime in Islamic law: hudud, qisas and ta’zir. 
Hudud crimes are the ones whose punishments are determined in the Quran and Sunna 
such as apostasy, transgression, theft, highway robbery, adultery, slander and drinking 
alcohol- whereas the qisas crimes are not determined in the Quran, and as such, decided 
according to the legal doctrine and judicial process. These are murder, voluntary homicide, 
involuntary homicide, intentional crimes against the person and unintentional crimes 
against the person.
124
 
On the other hand, ta’zir means discretionary punishment by the judge for the 
minor offences for which no textual punishment (hudud) is specified. It takes the form of 
imprisonment, fines, and physical punishments by hand, whip or stick, ta’zir punishments 
should be lower than the lowest punishments of other two categories.
125
 However, Heyd 
argues that the number of strokes could be much more than what is stated by sharia.
126
 
Also, for instance, hadd punishments cannot be applied upon suspicion whereas ta’zir is 
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obligatory if there is suspicion. Related to its being not as severe as hadd punishments, 
which are not applicable to minors, ta’zir punishments do not differentiate between minor 
and adults.
127
 
In most basic terms, ta’zir aims at protecting the social order, and in order to do 
that, any conduct thought to pose danger to social order can be punished. By ta’zir, it is 
intended to make individuals to desist from their “bad” or “inappropriate” habits. Thus 
ta’zir is corrective in feature. In deciding ta’zir, judges are assumed to consider the social 
interest, rehabilitation of the offender, the claims of the victim, and correction for violation 
of a regulatory norm.
128
 In what follows, I will try to show the relationship between status 
and ta’zir punishments by using Ottoman fatwa compilations. My discussion will be based 
on two interrelated pillars: On the one hand, I will focus on the question how people of 
different socioeconomic status get different punishments for the same crime, and on the 
other, I will present the conducts that were not considered as crime but became crimes 
when committed against a person of high status, a notable, Ulama etc. Three denominators 
of social status will occupy the centre ground of my discussion to show the varying 
positions of Ottoman individuals vis-a-vis law according to their status: Being a member of 
the Ottoman ruling class, either from the religious institution or military ranks, being a 
descendant of the Prophet, and being an honorable woman. 
 
 
 
II.2. Ta’zir and Status in Şeyhülislams’ Fatwas 
 
 
When Ottoman fatwa compilations are analyzed, the elite‟s advantageous position 
before law appears striking. These advantages are reflected in fatwas in two ways: at times, 
members of the elite enjoyed the privilege of immunity from punishment for crimes which 
would require punishment when committed by someone from among common people. At 
other times, when the aggrieved party was of elite status, even the simple revilements, 
which would otherwise be of no legal consequence, required punishment of the offender. 
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In general, ta’zir parts of the legal compilations start with typical inquiries in which 
the muftis are asked for a ruling on the descriptive features of ta’zir. These selections bring 
forward different opinions from medieval Islamic jurists. Accordingly, the lightest type 
was said to be composed of three lashes whereas the heaviest type was composed of thirty 
lashes. According to a report from Hanafi jurist Abu-Yusuf, however, the maximum of 
ta’zir was said to be as high as seventy five lashes.129 Providing different accounts and 
drawing attention to the difference between them, şeyhülislam Abdurrahim Efendi left it up 
to the discretion of the judge.  
 
What is the amount of heavy ta’zir? Answer: It is thirty nine. According to a report 
from Abu Yusuf, it is seventy five, yet another report says that it is seventy nine. Since 
there is difference of opinion, it is left to the judge to decide.
130
 
 
 
Although the chief muftis transmitted the opinions of the earlier jurists and left the 
decision to the judge‟s preference, they also clearly indicated the link between status and 
criminal charge. The fatwa below from the chief mufti Ibn Kemal proves to be 
corroboration for the fact that if one aspect of ta’zir is its variability according to the type 
of the crime, the other aspect of it is its variability according to the position and status of 
the offenders: 
 
What is ta’zir? Answer: there is a ta’zir proper to the situation of each person. The 
decision related to this matter is left to the judge. Up to one hundred strokes, it is 
ta’zir, and even the long term imprisonment is ta’zir.131 
 
 
                                                             
129
 Halebi, Multeka El-Ebhur, vol. 2: 286-87. 
130
 Ta‟zir-i şedid ne miktar celdedir? El-cevab: Otuz dokuzdur. Ebu Yusuf‟dan zahir 
rivayette yetmiş beştir rivayeti uhrada yetmiş dokuzdur. Ceraimde tefavüt vardır 
hakim bu nazardan ne miktar ile inzicaran-ı fehm ederse ona ihtiyar eder. Fetava-yı 
Abdurrahim, 1: 105. 
131
 Ta‟zir-i beliğ nedir? El-cevab: Her kimsenin haline münasip ta‟zir beliğ vardır. Ol 
hususda rey kadı‟nındır. Yüz değneğe dek ta‟zirdir haps-i medid dahi ta‟zirdir. 
İnanır, Ahmet. İbn Kemal’in Fetvaları Işığında Osmanlı’da İslam Hukuku. 
Unpublished PhD Dissertation, İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal bilimler Enstitüsü, 2008, 
131. 
44 
 
Zembilli Ali provides us with a concrete picture of the institutionalized privileges 
based on status and position. According to him, ta’zir of notables (eşraf) consists of 
informing them of the situation; ta’zir of scribes and chiefs occurs in the form of having 
them come to the office of the judge; ta’zir of middle class people is imprisonment; and 
ta’zir of lower class people is beating.132 
The same division based on status is present in Halebi, too. Providing us with a 
detailed list of revilements, Halebi sorts revilements according to whether they require 
ta’zir. Accordingly, revilements which required ta’zir when targeting a Muslim are as 
follows: dissolute, infidel, malign, thief, sinner, factious, sodomite, the people playing with 
children, the people getting interest, wine addict, pander, pimp, traitor, son of a bitch, son 
of a sinner woman, heretical, bawd, den of thieves, and illegitimate child. As for the ones 
that do not require ta’zir, Halebi includes among them lighter revilements such as cur, 
monkey, donkey, snake, porcine, blood taker, cunning, foolish and so on. However, these 
lighter revilements too were subjected to punishment when the aggrieved party was a 
notable person.
133
 
A fatwa from Ebussuud suggests that the relationship between ta’zir and status was 
much more established than we tend to assume. In reply to an inquiry asking about the 
appropriate punishment for a bath attendant of inappropriate conduct, the mufti expresses 
his opinion in favor of punishment of the person in question in the same way that other 
bath attendants are punished. This shows how decisive occupational status was in 
determining ta’zir; that is, the mufti‟s emphasis is not on the type of crime but on 
occupational status of the offender: 
 
Given that the seyyid Zeyd, who is a bath attendant in a waqf bath that he rented, 
engages in evil acts requiring ta’zir, in what way ta’zir needs to be imposed on him? 
Answer: He should be punished by the ta’zir imposed on other bath attendants.134 
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The short discussion above based on fatwas clearly reveals the fact that ta’zir was not 
a simple as its theoretical definition- the discretionary punishment for the crimes that do 
not fit in the categories of hudud and qisas- suggests. In practice it was complicated by 
considerations of socioeconomic differences and existing social hierarchy. In a way 
contradicting with the egalitarian discourse of Islam, and fed by custom and social 
hierarchy, varying ta’zir practices according to status represent quintessentially the 
institutionalized privileges in the Ottoman world. In what follows, the issue will be further 
analyzed with reference to the legal privileges of the some prominent groups in Ottoman 
society. 
 
 
 
II.2.1. The Ulama 
 
 
“Throughout Ottoman history, with few exceptions, members of the ilmiyye were 
immune from persecution and prosecution. Part of their special status derived from the 
fact that they served as guardians of din, religion. Ottoman Islam was the ideology 
through which the Ulama order gained nearly a total immunity. Even though religion 
was at the heart of the ideology, however, the continued support and favor offered the 
Ulama in the political and social arenas throughout the Empire‟s history require 
thorough and systematic study. Remarkably enough, this historiographical issue must 
be counted among the least studied in Ottoman scholarship.”135 
 
In tandem with the advantages that they enjoyed in social terms through marriages 
and as the guardians of religion, misbehaviors of the Ulama were somehow turned a blind 
eye, and this immunity from certain punishments was institutionalized as well. To be more 
precise, the Ulama were the most privileged class in terms of immunity from punishment. 
Although they enjoyed certain privileges compared to common people, until the imperial 
edict of Gülhane, Ottoman officials and officers could be killed discretionally by the sultan 
(i.e. siyaseten katl).
136
 The Ulama constituted the exception of this rule; they were 
generally immune from capital punishment and other forms of physical punishment 
including ta’zir. Instead, if considered necessary, they could be punished by dismissal or 
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banishment.
137
 This strong position of the Ulama had its background in Islamic culture. 
One could name many jurists and philosophers who wrote on this matter, but for our 
purposes al-Ghazali‟s perspective summarizes the essence of the matter; he said “god 
might forgive a scholar‟s sins because of his knowledge”.138 
The institutionalized privileges of the members of the Ottoman religious institution 
reflected in fatwas in several ways. In many instances, which have been already discussed 
in the previous chapter, the Ulama were praised and privileged as the guardians of religion, 
and as such, positioned in the highest echelon of the society in sharp contrast to the 
“ignorant” people. Related to this, two main legal privileges of the Ulama are reflected into 
the fatwas presented in this chapter: the penal immunity of the Ulama, and the sensitivity 
towards the preservation of the social prestige of the Ulama. The fatwa below from 
Abdurrahim Efendi clearly addresses penal immunity of the Ulama. 
 
If ta’zir is required for Amr who is from among the Ulama, in what way does the 
judge impose the punishment? Answer: By informing and saying that if you do so, do 
not do again.
139
 
 
 
As already stated, the legal advantages of the elite, in this case of the Ulama, were 
not limited to exemption from some punishments but also intended to secure their social 
prestige and grace by punishing revilements, or criticisms targeting the Ulama. In keeping 
with their privileged socio-legal position, perceived as threats to their legitimacy, no 
criticism of the religious institution and the learned men were tolerated.  
 
What should be done to the poet Zeyd if he falls into the habit of heavily criticizing 
some people from among the Ulama and righteous people? After punished by heavy 
ta’zir, he should be prisoned until his good conduct is certain.140 
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What is due people who say that all fatwas given in relation to four madhhabs are 
innovation (bid‘at) because they appeared after the time of the Prophet? Answer: After 
having been punished with heavy ta’zir, if they are reasonable enough, they think 
better of their doubts.
141
 
 
 
The fatwa below describes a different situation whereby the chief mufti does not 
prescribe an automatic punishment to criticism targeting some members of the ilmiyye, and 
herein lies its difference: the chief mufti does not find punishment necessary if the 
criticism is not about the scholarship of the criticized people but concerns with some 
illegitimate acts of the people from among the Ulama. 
 
What is due for Amr if he is in the habit of examining the imperfections of the 
religious scholars and experts of sharia, and condemning them vehemently in social 
gatherings in a way inculcating people with hatred towards the Ulama by saying that 
“what the judges eat and drinks are forbidden, and those of the mudarrises are not 
beyond doubt. Even ignorant people do not act the same way they do. The evil-doers 
are the learned men whereas the ignorant ones avoid the forbidden”? Answer: If his 
hatred towards the scholars of religion has something to do with their scholarship he 
becomes an infidel. However, if his hatred comprises the issues he attributed to 
Ulama, no punishment is required, provided he does not slander the innocent ones.
142
 
 
 
Apart from that, if we get back to Halebi‟s classification, some simple revilements 
were said to require ta’zir only if the aggrieved party was an important person. The same 
logic applies to the cases in which someone from the Ulama stood as the aggrieved party. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
olunup, tevbe ve salâhı zahir olmayınca ihrâc olmamak lâzımdır. Hazret-i Ömer İbn-
ül-Hattâb (radiyalldhu te'âlâ anh), Hatî'e, meşâhir-i şu'arâ-i İslâmiyyeden iken 
şi'rinde ba'zı kimselere ta'arruz etmeğin, ta'zîr ve habsedip, hapisten tevbesi zahir 
olmayınca ıtlak etmemiştir. Düzdağ, Ebussuud Fetvaları, 181. 
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 "Dört mezheb üzerine cümle verilen fetvaları bid'attir, Resûlullah (sallallâhu 
aleyhi ve sellem) zamanında yok idi" diyene şer'an ne lâzım olur? El-cevab: Ta'zîr-i 
şedîd olunduktan sonra, aklı var ise şüphesi' hallolmak lâzımdır. Düzdağ, Ebussuud 
Fetvaları, 178. 
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halka nefret verse ana ne lâzım olur? El-cevab: Eğer 'ulemâ-i dîne ilimleri için bu'z ü 
'adaveti olup söylediği andan nâşi ise küfür lâzımdır. İsnât ettiği umura te'âti için bu'z 
ederse nesne lâzım olmaz, içlerinde bî-günâh olanlara iftira etmeyicek. Düzdağ, 
Ebussuud Fetvaları, 181. 
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It can be said that since the chief muftis were the head of religious institution, they were 
sensitive about the prestige of the religious institution, and as such, they took seriously any 
attempt tending to injure the social prestige of the religious men. When informed of such 
cases, the chief muftis almost always approved the punishment of the offenders. Fatwa 
compilations include dozens of cases of this type. Below are a few typical examples: 
 
What should be done to the ignorant Zeyd if he insults the scholar and righteous Amr 
saying “who are you? O cruel!”? Answer: Ta’zir.143 
What is due for Amr who says to Zeyd, who knows the Quran and is of the Ulama, 
“compared to me, you are not even excrement, excrement is preferable? Answer: 
Ta’zir is required.144 
Are renewal of belief and act of marriage due for the Muslim Zeyd who says to Amr 
from among the Ulama that “I would not swear by have faith in you even you were the 
Prophet”. Answer: Yes.145 
What is due for the ignorant Zeyd who slandered the learned Amr by calling him 
“cursed and liar”? Answer: Ta’zir should be imposed on him by judicial decision.146 
 
 
 
II.2.2. Notables 
 
 
If discretionary punishment is required for Zeyd from among the notables, in what 
way does the judge impose the punishment? Answer: By informing and having him 
come to the door of the judge related to the event in which he is involved.
147
 
                                                             
143
 Zeyd-i cahil, ehl-i ilm ve salih olan Amr‟a “sen nesin bre zalim” deyu şetm eylese 
Zeyd‟e ne lazım olur? El-cevab: Ta‟zir. Fetava-yı Ali Efendi, 1: 138. 
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119. 
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 Zeyd-i câhil, ehl-i ilmden Amr‟a "behey mel'un, be hey kezzâb" dese şer'an ne 
lâzım olur? El-cevab: Re'y-i hâkim ile ta'zir olunur. Düzdağ, Ebussuud Fetvaları, 
181. 
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 Eşrafdan olan Zeyd‟e şeran ta‟zir icab eyledikte hakim Zeyd‟i ne veche üzere 
ta‟zir eder? El-cevab: İlam ile ve bab-ı kadıya cerr-i husumet ile ta‟zir eder. Feteva-yı 
Abdurrahim, 1: 105. 
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The above fatwa from Abdurrahim Efendi informs us of the legal privileges that the 
elites enjoyed. Informed that the person is engaged in a ta’zir-requiring act, the 
circumstances of which remains unknown to us, the chief mufti grants the person immunity 
from being physical punishment, which was the regular form of ta’zir imposed the 
offenders from among common people. Most of the elites shared similar privileges by 
virtue of their social ties and networks regardless of their profession. However, as this 
example suggests, the immunity of notables from ta’zir was different from that of the 
Ulama. Unlike the Ulama whose ta’zir was not to go beyond a warning for not repeating 
their mistake, the notables had to go to the office of the judge, which might have been 
considered beneath a notable‟s dignity. Although not as derogatory as beating was, getting 
to the court was considered as something which was equally beneath an elite‟s dignity. 
However, this does not mean that elites did not appear in the court in person. On the 
contrary, they were very present at the court for various businesses. At this point, it is 
likely that elites avoided appearing at the court as defendant due to the possible social 
stigma attached to it and thus we should not confuse defendant position with other ways of 
presence at the court. A fatwa from Ebussuud Efendi clearly reflects elites‟ avoidance of 
appearing at the court in person. Equally important for our purposes is the reply of the 
chief mufti which welcomes warmly the person‟s demand of not being ready in the court 
due to his fame. In a sense, the chief mufti‟s reply suggests that such demands were not 
unusual or surprising: 
 
Can Zeyd appoint an agent for his case with Amr by saying that “I am renowned” 
although he does not have any legal excuse? Answer: Yes, he can even he does not 
have a legal excuse.
148
 
 
 
It should be noted that being a member of the askeri, non-tax-paying ruling class, did 
not mean to be a notable, and thus, it did not bring an automatic exemption from 
punishment. This also held true for soldiers who were punished for the crimes they 
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 Zeyd Amr ile olan da'vâsına, özr-i şer'îsi yok iken "ben zîşânım" deyu vekîl nasb 
eylemeğe kadir olur mu? El-cevab: Olur, ma'zûre dahi değil ise. Düzdağ, Ebussuud 
Fetvaları, 177. 
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committed. However, compared to common people, they also had certain privileges. For 
example, they could choose to be tried in special courts before the military judge or by 
their own commanders, instead of ordinary judges.
149
 Accordingly, if they faced a lawsuit 
from a civilian, soldiers could refuse to appear in an ordinary court in favor of being tried 
by the military judge: 
 
Can Amr from the askeri reject the town habitant Zeyd‟s demand that the case in 
which both are involved as plaintiffs to be tried before the judge of Edirne saying “I 
want to have my suit tried before the military judge”? Answer: Yes he can.150 
 
 
However, Heyd argues that soldiers were not privileged but tried by a local judge if 
they were engaged in non-military offences.
151
 Therefore, when they were invited to the 
court related to a non-military offence, they had to appear in local courts in person as any 
ordinary person. The following fatwa exemplifies such a situation. Although its 
circumstances remain unknown to us, we can assume that the matter was non-military, 
most probably about family matters, since the other party was his wife; and as such, the 
man‟s membership to askeri class did not prevent the chief mufti from passing his remark 
in favor of the man‟s punishment by ta’zir. 
 
What is due for Zeyd of the askeri if he rejects his wife Hind‟s invitation to the court 
by saying that “I do not come with you, bring a çavuş to take me to the court”? 
Answer: Ta’zir.152 
 
 
The chief muftis were sensitive regarding petty offences committed against the 
notables. Any possible harm targeted the social prestige of notables, including the simple 
revilements, was thought to require punishment. As already noted, when said to a 
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 Beledi olan Zeyd-i müddei askeri olan Amr-ı müddea aleyhe  “seninle Edirne 
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murafaa olurum” demeğe kadir olur mu? El-cevab: Olur. Fetava-yı Ali Efendi, 1: 
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 Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, 221. 
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 Hind askeri taifesinden olan zevci Zeyd'i şera‟ davet ettikte Zeyd Hind‟e ben 
seninle gitmem var çavuş getir dese zeyde ne lazım olur? El-cevab: Ta‟zir. Fetava-yı 
Abdurrahim, 1: 110. 
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commoner some forms of purple language such as „donkey‟, „cur‟ or „porcine‟ were not 
deemed to require discretionary punishment. When the insulted person was a notable, 
however, the offender was punished by ta’zir. At this point, it can be argued that what 
mattered was not the damage caused by the offence, but rather the sensitivity towards 
keeping people in their appropriate places, and preventing them from transgressing their 
limits:  
 
What should be done to Zeyd if he insults Amr from among the notables saying “you 
cur!”? Answer: Ta’zir.153 
 
What should be done to Zeyd if he insults Amr from among the notables saying “you 
excrement!”? Answer: Ta’zir.154 
 
 
That being said, another crucial point needs to be mentioned that patron and client 
relationship could provide individuals with certain advantages before the law. The people 
who had strong vertical ties could manage not to get, or at least mitigate punishment for the 
illegal acts they were involved in. For instance, Ginio informs us of a case from Salonica 
court records in which a eunuch intervened in favor of his apparent protégé, and enabled 
him to be released from prison by the order of sultan. Apart from that, he highlights also 
the direct effect of social ties and power relations in the legal process noting the frequent 
intervention of the local notables to the legal process, at times for the release of a culprit 
affiliated to them, at other times to shorten their imprisonment term.
155
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 Zeyd eşrafdan Amr‟a “bre köpek” deyu şetm eylese Zeyd‟e ne lazım olur. El-
cevab: Ta‟zir. Fetava-yı Ali Efendi, 1: 139. 
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 Zeyd eşrafdan Amr‟a “bre necaset” deyu şetm eylese Zeyd‟e ne lazım olur. El-
cevab: Ta‟zir. Fetava-yı Ali Efendi, 1: 139. 
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 Eyal Ginio, “Patronage and Violence in the Legal Process” 111-131; Also see, 
Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812," in An Economic and Social 
History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, eds. Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 637-758; Işık Tamdoğan, 
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II.2.3. Seyyids 
 
 
Seyyid and sharif are the special terms meaning membership to the family of the 
prophet Muhammad.
156
 Empowered by the only institutionalized lineage, the descendants 
of the prophet Muhammad, seyyids, enjoyed an advantageous social position in most 
Muslim societies, including the Ottoman Empire. As a sign of their respect to seyyids, 
Muslim states bestowed them exemption from various taxes, designated for them a 
distinctive dress code identified with the green turban
157
, and obliged the public to respect 
them.
158
 
In the Ottoman Empire, any claimant to descent from the prophet had to obtain the 
approval of state, which meant to prove a claim before the nakibüleşraf (the chief of the 
descendants of the prophet). In this connection, Canbakal shows that the creation of the 
office of the imperial nakibüleşraf and the attempt to introduce central registration of 
seyyids took place at the turn of the 16th century.
159
  The claimants had to fulfill two main 
preconditions to have their name recorded in the list of the descendants of the prophet: 
having witnesses from among the seyyids, and proving the family members‟ involvement 
in the lists of seyyids during the time of the previous nakibüleşraf.160 However, establishing 
a person‟s identity was not an easy matter that could be achieved by the limited means of 
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 Rüya Kılıç, “Sayyids and Sharifs in the Ottoman State: On the Borders of the 
True and the False,” Muslem World 96 (2006): 21. 
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 Although the green turban has been the most common public mark for seyyids, 
some variations in regard to both time and place should be noted. During the time of 
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communication and strategies used by pre-moderns states, but rather it was, as Haykel 
argues, “a hoary problem in every human society, Islamic or otherwise, and often led to 
spectacular cases of imposture across time and place.”161 The same difficulty holds true for 
distinguishing real seyyids and fake seyyids who sought privileges of seyyids. Related to 
this point, Canbakal draws our attention to the considerable increase in the number of 
seyyids in the Ottoman Empire from 16
th
 century onwards, which was caused not only by 
the ambitions of the common people for the privileges of seyyidship but also, possibly, by 
state policies aiming at obtaining the loyalty of tribes and Alevids.
162
 She argues that this 
increase was in no small part caused by the vulnerability of the judicial process which 
recorded people as seyyids even if the people bearing witness to their claim were 
seyyids.
163
 The matter of false seyyids was reflected in fatwas as well: 
 
What is due for Zeyd who insulted the seyyid Amr by saying “you! False seyyid” and 
responded to him “You infidel! God damn you and your ancestors” when Amr replied 
his first revilement by saying “I am of the descendants of the prophet Muhammad”? 
Answer: Ta’zir is required, and if they demand, he should beg the pardon of the elders 
of the seyyid in question.
164
 
 
What should be done to Zeyd if he robes green turban and falsely says “I am of the 
descendants of the Prophet” with the aim of attaching himself to the pure lineage? 
Answer: He should be punished by heavy ta’zir, and kept in prison until his 
repentance and good conduct become obvious, and he should be prevented from using 
the signs special to seyyids.
165
 
 
                                                             
161
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 Zeyd sadat-ı kiramdan olan Amr‟a “bre müteseyyid” deyup, Amr dahi “ben sadat-
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The connection between the usurpation of seyyid status and socioeconomic status of 
the claimants to the title should also be emphasized. As Canbakal argues, after the 16
th
 
century, the notables frequently usurped seyyid status.
166
 Besides many limits to control 
and prevent usurpation of the title, she argues that the system‟s reliance on the social 
recognition in detecting the authenticity of the claims contributed considerably to the 
proliferation of seyyidship among the notables due to their reputation in the community. 
Moreover, she also draws our attention to the chance that the notables enjoyed in terms of 
marrying into sadat families
167
, which will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
            By virtue of the nobility attached to their lineage, seyyids differed from ordinary 
individuals in Ottoman society. Judging by the relevant fatwas, seyyids‟ social asset could 
be transferred into legal process in a way that paralleled their state-sponsored social 
prestige. In what reflected into fatwas, a two way interaction between the advantageous 
social standing of seyyids and their legal privileges is conspicuously reflected in fatwas: on 
the one hand, seyyids could be pardoned when involved in certain acts which would 
otherwise require ta’zir, and on the other hand, when the aggrieved party was a seyyid, 
simple revilements could culminate in the punishment of the perpetrator party by ta’zir. 
The fatwa below from Ibn Kemal combines these two legal attitudes: 
 
If a person who is a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad [a seyyid] says to someone, 
“You idiot! You cur!” and that person in turn says “That‟s what you are!” legally what 
must be done to the two of them? Answer: The seyyid is pardoned; the other is 
sentenced to punishment by the judge.
168
 
 
 
This fatwa is a good example opening a legitimate ground to discuss the legal 
privileges of seyyids and the relationship between social status and legal status. In this 
example, we are not given the details of the dispute between these two people. What we 
have rather is the words that they used during the quarrel: according to the fatwa, the 
                                                             
166
 Hülya Canbakal, “On the nobility of urban notables,” in A. Anastasopoulos (ed.), 
Halcyon Days in Crete 5, (Rethymno, Greece: Crete University Press, 2005), 39-50. 
167
 Canbakal, “On the Nobility”, p. 45. 
168
 Leslie Peirce, "The law shall not languish: Social Class and Public Conduct in 
16th-century Ottoman legal discourse," in The Hermeneutics of Honor: Negotiation 
of Public Space in Islamic Societies, ed. Asma Afsaruddin (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 151-152. 
55 
 
person who affronted the other first is the seyyid; what the other person did is only to speak 
in response, and not with different or heavier words but by exactly the same words. 
However, although the one who started the quarrel was the seyyid, and the other person 
responded the revilement in the same way, the mufti expresses his opinion in favor of the 
punishment of the other person and exculpation of the seyyid.  
This is not the only fatwa to that effect. Many examples confirm the already 
mentioned point that simple revilements did require ta’zir only if the aggrieved party was a 
notable, a member of the Ulama, seyyid etc. Accordingly, inquiries asking for the opinion 
of the mufti regarding the punishment appropriate for the offenders who insulted seyyids 
are in abundance in the ta’zir parts of the fatwa compilations: 
 
What is due for Amr if he insults the seyyid and pilgrim Zeyd saying “you cur! Do not 
be full of yourself for you becoming a pilgrim, even a donkey can arrive at Mecca”? 
Answer: Ta’zir should be applied by the judicial decision.169 
What is due for Amr if he is vexed with the seyyid Zeyd and says to him “look at that 
face and body”? Answer: Ta’zir.170 
What should legally be done to Zeyd if he insults the seyyid Amr saying “You cur!”? 
Answer: Ta’zir.171 
 
 
Interestingly enough, for some revilements which directly targeted the seyyid status 
itself the anticipated punishment is not ta’zir but ta’dib. Lexically, ta’dib means 
chastening; corrective punishment for a fault; or to teach someone his place (haddini 
bildirmek).
172
 Although in what ways ta’dib was imposed remains ambiguous, especially 
the last part of the definition, teaching some his place, is crucial for the following 
examples. In one sense, the intention behind this punishment was to remind the offenders 
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the difference of status between them and seyyids, which is in keeping with the state-
warranted social respect to seyyids. However, here we again have to face the limits of our 
sources: since we are not given the context of the events, we cannot figure out whether the 
insulted seyyids were from among the ones who usurped the certificate of seyyidship later, 
and hence, whether the revilements against them were a result of doubts about the 
authenticity of their seyyidship. 
 
What should be done to Zeyd if he insults the seyyid Amr saying “have you become 
big bird by becoming a descendant of the prophet, hit your head to the hardest stone”? 
Answer: Ta’dib is required.173 
 
What should be done to Zeyd if he insults the seyyid Amr saying “I am the subject of 
the Sultan; you are the penis of cur!”? Answer: Ta’dib.174 
 
 
It should be noted, however, that the respect and toleration towards seyyids were not 
limitless, meaning that they could be subjected to ta’zir, or even executed according to the 
severity of the crime or activity that they were involved in. According to a 17th century 
traveler, seyyids‟ punishment was imposed with special consideration: “when a şerif was 
condemned to the bastinado his green turban was first respectfully removed, placed on an 
embroidered handkerchief and covered with another one; only then was the punishment 
inflicted.”175 Our fatwas suggest that if they engaged in any activity challenging the 
legitimacy of the state or Islamic law, their status fell short to rescue them from 
punishment. The following fatwas are important for two reasons: firstly, they show the 
limits of the seyyid status; and secondly, they signify that seyyids were well aware of their 
privileged status, and sometimes, as is the case here, they did not hesitate exaggerating this 
status. Especially, the first fatwa is very crucial in terms of its ability to represent an 
extreme example of the meanings attributed to seyyid status: 
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What is due for them if some of the descendants of Prophet Muhammad say that “even 
if we offend individuals [as opposed to god or the state as implied by huquq Allah
176
], 
we are immune to divine judgment; we ascend to heaven unconditionally”? Answer: 
Believing this way, they become deniers. If they insist on their claim, they should be 
executed.
177
 
What should legally be done to Zeyd if he rejects Amr‟s invitation to be present in the 
court for the case related to a dispute between him and Amr by saying that “I will not 
come with you; since I am a seyyid, bring a çavuş from the nakib”? Answer: Ta’zir is 
required.
178
 
 
 
 
II.2.4. Muhaddere 
 
 
In fatwa compilations, the principle of seclusion strikes the eye as one of the most 
strongly worded issues. In numerous examples, the chief muftis expressed their sensitivity 
about the matter of female seclusion: they disapproved women‟s public appearance on her 
own even for the most basic outdoor dealings and the prayers, and as such, allowed the 
society to control women‟s good conduct in public, and men to exercise ultimate authority 
in limiting their wives‟ public appearance. Despite of the significance of such fatwas, here 
I will only deal with the term muhaddere due to the fact that it is placed at the intersection 
of the three major axes of this study: law, status, and social order.  
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Lexically, muhaddere means veiled, modest women, virtuous lady.
179
 As its 
definition suggests, a woman‟s honour was directly linked to the degree that she satisfied 
the requirements of the principle of seclusion. Put differently, women who fulfilled this 
principle enjoyed high social prestige. Related to this prestige-generating aspect of acting 
in accordance with seclusion, the principle of seclusion had important socioeconomic 
implications. It has been widely argued in the secondary literature that seclusion was a 
matter of class. Peirce draws our attention to the link between seclusion and wealth. She 
argues that since material means were required for women to assure seclusion, it was a 
privilege of the elite women to qualify for muhaddere status.
180
 In his study on 18th 
century Aleppo, Marcus makes the similar point that wealthy women of Aleppo could 
fulfill the principle of female seclusion since their daily outdoor dealings, such as shopping 
or other errand, were run by their servants, thereby unburdening them of the trouble of 
mixing with the public; and “court documents referred to these wealthy models of 
righteous female life as “the most eminent of secluded women” (fakhr al-
mukhaddarat).”181 
Considering the women of lower economic status, however, the picture changes 
radically; economic concerns subordinated the principle of seclusion. In other words, in 
order to make a living, the women of lower socioeconomic status had to work out of home 
and mix with the public. These women worked in various jobs such as maids, midwives, 
wet nurses, matchmakers, bonesetters, hairdressers, professional mourners, beautician at 
weddings, bath house attendants, tutors for girls, textile workers, peddlers, singers, 
dancers, prostitutes, procurers of prostitution, and distillers of alcohol.
182
 As both 
Sariyannis and Zarinebaf show, women of lower economic status committed crimes in 
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cooperation with their husbands in order to survive regardless of the socially assumed 
gender roles.
183
 The picture we encounter in rural areas, too, supports the existence of such 
a deep relationship between economic concerns and seclusion. In rural areas, women 
actively participated in outdoor activities as but they were not subjected to any social 
stigma unlike their urban counterparts.
184
 This suggests that besides being a matter of class, 
seclusion was also an urban phenomenon. 
Moreover, due to the shortness of their material means, many families of lower 
socioeconomic status had to live in communal dwellings, a situation directly limiting the 
possibility of proper seclusion for women. As Marcus shows, there were many families 
sharing adjoint residences facing each other and using the same courtyard (avlu)
185
.This 
does not mean that those families living in shared houses did not have privacy concerns. 
Nevertheless, they had to dwell in this kind of communal residences rather than private 
residences due to economic reasons regardless of their privacy concerns. 
What has been presented thus far can be crosschecked in the light of a set of inquiries 
addressed to Ebussuud Efendi. The fatwas in question seem to have been intended to 
obtain the legal opinion regarding the basic criterion to measure whether a woman was 
honorable. Both the inquiries and the replies to them emphasize the essential link between 
seclusion and honor on women‟s part. 
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Can Hind be muhaddere if she goes to the public bath and to the countryside? Answer: 
Yes, provided she goes in a way not vitiating her honor and respectability, and is 
companied by servants.
186
 
Can Hind be muhaddere if she goes to the public bath, to weddings, and to other 
neighborhoods? Answer: Yes, if she is accompanied by her retinue.
187
 
 
 
Apart from their emphasis on seclusion of women, these fatwas highlight an 
important point closely associated with our whole discussion. In both examples, the chief 
mufti seems to have affirmed women‟s public appearance on one condition- women had to 
be accompanied by their retinue. This again reveals the difference in elite women‟s and 
lower class women‟s chances of appearing in public space free of any social stigma. Given 
that employing servants and attendants was not possible for everyone but mostly a 
privilege for the better-off families, in no sense can the issue be discussed independently of 
the socioeconomic status of individuals.  
 
Can Hind of a village be muhaddere if she handles her own affairs and brings water 
from the spring? Answer: She is not.
188
 
 
Can Hind be muhaddere if she appears to her father‟s freed slaves and their sons as 
well as husbands of her sisters? Answer: The essential element of being muhaddere is 
not to act upon the rulings of the noble Sharia. For this reason, even non-Muslim 
women can be muhaddere. A woman can be muhaddere if she does not handle her 
own affairs, and avoids appearing to men who are not of the family.
189
 
 
 
In order to meet such a criterion, however, two things were required: having servants 
to run errands and other daily business of women, and more importantly, not being obliged 
to work outside of the home. In one sense, as the examples suggest, economic status 
                                                             
186
 Hamam ve kuraya giden Hind muhaddere olur mu? El-cevab: Olur, ırz ü vakarla 
ve hadem ü haşem ile giderse. Düzdağ, Ebussuud Fetvaları, 55. 
187
 Hamam ve düğüne ve ahar mahalleye seyrana giden Hind muhaddere olur mu? 
El-cevab: Olur, eğer haşmetle varır ise. Düzdağ, Ebussuud Fetvaları, 55. 
188
 Karye ehlinden maslahatını kendi görüp, pınardan su getiren Hind, muhaddere 
olur mu? El-cevab: Olmaz.  Düzdağ, Ebussuud Fetvaları, 55. 
189
 Babası „utekasına ve evlad-ı „uteka ve hemşireleri zevcine görünen Hind 
muhaddere olur mu? El-cevab: Muhadderelikte mu‟teber olan hudud-i şerait-i 
şerifeyi riayet değildir. Onuncun kafirelerde dahi muhaddere bulunur. Ele görünüp 
mesalihine bizzat mübaşeret eder değilse muhadderedir. Düzdağ, Ebussuud 
Fetvaları, 55. 
61 
 
proved to take precedence over religious status in establishing a woman‟s identity as 
muhaddere. Considering the fact that many women had to work outside of the home, and 
as such, to mix with the public to earn their living, though we do not know its extent as far 
as urban women are concerned, the chief mufti‟s criteria support the existence of a 
convincing link between presenting elite way of life and the concerns of seclusion as the 
ideal model. 
In the light of the discussion above, it is obvious that elite women had far greater 
chance to fulfill the requirements of being muhaddere, and thus, enjoying a higher status in 
society. At the same time, different legal attitudes were prevalent towards women 
according to their socially assumed morality. Whether a woman qualified as an honorable 
woman from the perspective of legal doctrine or stayed out of this category came into 
effect in determining their legal rights. Women who had the status of muhaddere enjoyed 
certain legal privileges which were reflected in both fatwas and statute books. For instance, 
a related article from the statute book of sultan Süleyman stipulates different punishments 
for the same crime according to whether the involved women were muhaddere:  
 
“If women come to blows and tear each other‟s hair or beat each other severely -if 
they are not veiled ladies (muhadderat), [the cadi] shall chastise [them] severely and a 
fine of one akçe shall be collected for every two strokes; if they are veiled ladies, [the 
cadi] shall threaten their husbands and a fine of 20 akçe shall be collected.”190 
 
 
This article reveals that elite women could escape from ta’zir like elite men. As 
already argued, ta’zir of elite men was limited to inform them about their misbehaviors and 
having them come to the office of the judge. As the article above suggests, the same held 
true for elite women whose ta’zir was converted to a fine instead of beating. In other 
words, elite status enabled both men and women escape corporal punishment.  
Apart from that, fatwas show another legal privilege that elite women attained by 
virtue of acting in accordance with the principle of seclusion, namely, they could authorize 
male proxies to act for them instead of appearing in court in person. Actually, it seems that 
not appearing in the court in person was regarded as a requirement of being muhaddere: 
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Given that she is in the habit of appearing to men, and presenting herself in court, can 
Hind be muhaddere? Answer: She cannot.
191
 
If muhaddere Hind and Zeyneb appoint Amr as their agent for the law suit related to 
their dispute with Zeyd, can Zeyd demand their being ready in court instead of their 
appearance by attorney? Answer: He cannot.
192
 
 
 
As the last example reveals, if they had a dispute with a muhaddere, men could not 
insist on the woman‟s appearance in the court in person. Considering the advantageous 
position of elite women in establishing their status as muhaddere, it can be said that elite 
women were the ones who benefitted most from the legal tolerance showed towards the 
muhaddere women. Several studies based on court records seem to corroborate this 
observation. For instance, Peirce argues that 16
th
 century court records of Ayntab show that 
elite women did not appear in the court at all.
193
  Similarly, Tucker argues that elite women 
seem to have appeared far less frequently than women of lower socioeconomic status in the 
court records of 18
th
-century Damascus, Nablus and Jerusalem.
194
 Although elite women‟s 
underrepresentation in the court records does not necessarily mean that they did not appear 
in the court at all, it still supports the possibility that by virtue of their muhaddere status, 
elite women were able to refuse to be present at the court. Instead, they authorized male 
proxies to act on their behalf in the court. Although everyone could authorize a proxy, the 
women who were not known as muhaddere were legally incapacitated to refuse to be 
present in the court if the opposing party or the judge was not content with appearance of a 
proxy only. Thus, if summoned, non-muhaddere women had to appear in the court in 
person; otherwise they would be punished by ta’zir. 
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What is due for non-muhaddere Hind if she defaults and does not attend the court, 
albeit invited by Zeyd of opposing party? Answer: Ta’zir.195 
Given that non-muhaddere Hind maliciously appoints Amr as agent in her lawsuit 
with Zeyd, can Zeyd object saying “I want to have oral argument with Hind herself”? 
Answer: Yes, he can.
196
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In conclusion, what I have tried to show in this chapter is the existence of a 
convincing link between socioeconomic status, law, and social order with reference to 
various interrelated points ranging from varying punishments according to social status to 
the representation of the elite way of life as ideal from a religious point of view. In this 
connection, the fatwas analyzed here suggest that people of different status could get 
different punishments for the same crimes that they committed. In other words, social 
hierarchy found an echo in the muftis‟ rulings which made concessions to the people from 
the higher echelons of the society. 
In this regard, the severity of ta’zir punishments varied not only according to the type 
of the crimes committed but also according to the socioeconomic status of offenders. It has 
been argued that the Ulama were the most privileged group in terms of immunity from 
certain punishments. This immunity was in line with the Ulama‟s crucial position in the 
Ottoman polity as the guardians of the religion. Apart from the Ulama, other social groups 
were subjected to legal charges accordance with their socioeconomic position. In other 
words, the higher the socioeconomic position of the offender was, the lower the charge he 
got.  
Throughout this chapter I argued that the legal concessions made to elites were 
linked to concerns for the maintenance of the social order. In a sense, the Ottoman polity 
was depended on the distinctions between different social groups in terms of 
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socioeconomic and legal privileges. Material to this point, the issue of muhaddere has been 
considered as a useful basis to show the intersection between wealth, social prestige and 
legal status. In this regard, it has been argued that seclusion was an elite ideal due to the 
means required to qualify it, and thus, it enabled elite women establish their status as 
honorable. 
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                 Chapter III 
 
 
MARRIAGE AS STATUS; PRESERVING EXISTING SOCIAL 
HIERARCHY 
 
 
One man of the men of virtue was always telling to his children that I have 
always been doing you favors; before, while as well as after your birth. They 
[the children] asked that how it could be possible doing someone favors before 
his birth? He replied; before you were born, I generated you from a good, 
clean, and pedigreed woman. I did not marry a woman from lower [status] 
families so that you would not suffer an affront and fall into contempt for this 
reason during your life.
197
 
 
Among other social contracts, marriage appears to be an issue of primary 
importance through which distinctions and hierarchal structure of societies have long been 
maintained. The possibility of matching between two people can either be prevented or 
supported by their socioeconomic standing since marriage is attributed some expectations 
not only by the families involved but also by the relevant society. What makes the equality 
in marriage an issue lies in its social connotations, that is to say, “no criterion is more 
indicative of social stratification among a group than that of whom they consider equal to, 
and therefore worthy of, marrying their daughters”.198 In this part, I will focus on the issue 
of marriage equality in the Ottoman Empire by using examples from Ottoman fatwa 
                                                             
197
 “Efadilden birisi evladına dermiş ki ben size doğmanızdan evvel, doğduğunuz 
zaman, doğduktan sonra iyilik edip duruyorum. Doğmazdan evvel iyilik nasıl olur? 
Derler. Dermiş ki doğmazdan evvel size iyi, temiz, soyu sopu belli bir kadından 
tehsil ettim. Alçak ailelerden kadın almadım ki müddet-i hayatınızda bu sebeple lavm 
ve ta‟na uğramayacaksınız.” Kınalızade Ali Efendi, cited in Mehmet Ali Ayni, Türk 
Ahlakçıları, p. 89. 
198
 Farhat J. Ziadeh, “Equality (Kafā'a) in Muslim Law of Marriage,” The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 6:4 (1957): 503. 
66 
 
compilations. Before proceeding into the fatwas, a theoretical frame, that will enable us to 
understand the Ottoman case better, needs to be provided. 
 
 
 
III.1. The Islamic Principle of Equality in Marriage: Kafā'a 
 
 
The special term used for the Islamic principle of marriage equality is kafā'a, an 
Arabic term that literally means equality, parity and aptitude, but in the terminology of 
fiqh, it states the “equivalence of social status, fortune and profession (those followed by 
the husband and by the father-in-law) as well as parity of birth, which should exist between 
husband and wife, in default of which the marriage is considered ill-matched and, in 
consequence, liable to break-up”.199 As mentioned by some scholars, Quran has no clear 
indications of such a principle, and actually kafā'a fails to comply with the egalitarian 
principles of Islam. However, kafā'a became a part of the Islamic holy law, and made its 
presence felt in a considerable part of the social and familial relations in Islamic societies, 
if in different ways.
200
 Taking its origins from the pre-Islamic Arab traditions, in which 
main differences in terms of wealth and influence prevailed to play a decisive role in 
spouse selections,
201
 this principle became institutionalized and expanded both in effect 
and content in the later centuries of Islam.  
In general, the principle was mainly concerned with the equality, or if possible 
superiority, of men to women in marriage with respect to religion, freedom, lineage, piety, 
occupation and wealth. In Shafi´i doctrine, these criteria were added with equality in age 
and absence of physical defects on the husband‟s end.202 The party who was supposed to 
measure up the other in marriage was the male partner. This rule has much to do with the 
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men‟s religiously-sanctioned superiority over women. According to jurists, there was no 
reason for men to be annoyed by the lower status of their wives because, as Ibn Abidin 
says, “the marriage is a kind of slavery to the women, while the husband is master”.203 If 
we take the marriage as something this analogy suggests, it also becomes obvious that 
being free was required for men since a “slave” could not be the “master” of a free Muslim 
woman in marriage. Accordingly, a man should be a free Muslim to measure up a free 
Muslim woman. However, being a free Muslim do not automatically guarantee a man‟s 
equality to a Muslim women; instead men were required to measure religiously up to 
women at least in the last three generations, that is to say, if both a woman‟s father and 
grandfather were Muslim as she was, then, the man was required to satisfy the same 
lineage. This quality was not demanded for more than past three generations.
204
 It should 
also be noted that while Muslim men could marry non-Muslim women from among Jews 
and Christians (people of book [kitabiyya]), which excludes polytheists and idolaters, 
Muslim women were required to marry Muslim men.  
Not every Muslim was persona grata in the society‟s perspective. At this juncture, 
piety becomes a requisite in default of which being Muslim by itself did not mean much. 
For this reason, piety was as important as satisfying the quality of being Muslim. In order 
to avoid the stigma of impious groom, the bride‟s side is provided with the right to look for 
the principle of equality in piety. As noted in previous chapters, performing religious duties 
regularly was a means of social prestige; therefore, such a principle comes as no surprise. 
The importance attached to piety was so great that according to Maliki doctrine, piety is 
the only criterion in default of which a marriage could result in divorce. The idea behind 
this doctrine was that Maliki School regarded marriage equality as a safeguard of 
preventing women from marrying men of bad moral status.
205
 
Once criteria of lineage, religion, and piety are met, material concerns, which best 
manifested themselves in the principle of equality in wealth and occupation, come to fore. 
Although strongly related with each other, occupation and wealth were of different 
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spheres. Wealth was much more germane to lineage when compared to occupation which 
was more about personal status. Apart from Malikis, all the Sunni schools of law affirmed 
equality in wealth and occupation as an absolute prerequisite for marriage. For Hanbelis, 
apart from satisfying the principles of equality in religion and piety which were the 
indisputable prerequisites accepted by all the Sunni schools of law, equality in wealth and 
occupation was the only criterion for man‟s measuring his partner in marriage.206 In terms 
of occupation, the groom had to measure up to the bride‟s father or grandfather. If a 
woman had a profession, albeit unlikely, her profession provided no basis on which to 
compare with that of the groom. Other than the income variation they created, occupational 
status provided individuals with certain advantages or disadvantages in almost every walk 
of the everyday life. Thus, the main criteria seem to be connected not only with material 
affairs but also with reputation of a particular occupation.  
With some considerable variations, all four law schools of Sunni Islam adopted 
aforementioned equality principles between spouses. The Hanafi School, which the 
Ottomans adopted as the official school of law, is said to have the most rigid rules in 
marriage equality which is evident in the right given to the guardians (wali) to annul 
marriages violating the kafa’a principle. In the Hanafi School, women who reached their 
puberty no longer have to go by the directions of their guardians when deciding to whom 
they would marry.
207
 At the first look, it may seem a „democratic way‟ in which individual 
will is given credit. However, this right seems to have led to the application of the 
requirements of marriage equality rather more strictly when compared to those of other 
madhhabs. To put the phrase differently, women of full-age enjoyed the right to choose 
their spouse provided that the requirements of marriage equality are satisfied. Walis could 
demand the annulment of the marriage in cases in which women married themselves off 
without the permission of their walis, or the groom brought about the marriage under false 
pretence. However, the guardian could annul the marriage only if the bridegroom had no 
child. Once a marriage between nonequals was settled within the wali‟s knowledge, the 
wali was no longer able to apply to the judge with an annulment request. The rigidity of the 
Hanafi School, according to Ziadeh, was caused by its being the imperial law during the 
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Abbasid Empire as well as by local traditions and the highly stratified society in Iraq and 
Kufa. Accordingly, the Hanafi School appropriated social distinctions and the complex 
society into consideration in its rulings. Related to geography based differences, the Maliki 
School is said to have inherited its moderate tone from the social composition of Medina 
where stratification was less tangible. Explained with reference to their original 
birthplaces, the differences between the Hanafi and the Maliki schools reinforced the 
assumption that Islamic law had been fed by the local traditions, which is the issue of an 
on-going debate over the relationship between Islamic law and custom.     
 
 
 
III.2. Concerns for Equality in Marriage as Reflected in Ottoman Fatwa 
Compilations 
 
 
As it can be understood from the Islamic principles regarding marriage equality, it 
is all clear that marriage has been an institution beyond being simply a matter of two 
people‟s combining their lives in line with their personal choices. In tandem with 
marriage‟s strong association with power alliances, social prestige, and economic 
networks, marriage and decisions related to marriage occupied an important place in the 
lives of Ottoman individuals. Judging by fatwas, it seems that Ottoman society was 
sensitive to almost all components of the principal of marriage equality.  
Intricate queries addressed to the muftis in regard to whom to marry were in 
abundance, and a considerable number among them are related to the criteria of being 
Muslim and free. At this point, I would like to remind the reader again that the present 
study primarily problematizes the link between socioeconomic status and legal status, and 
consequently the points that are not caused by socioeconomic status of individuals but 
rather of relatively well-defined categories of Islamic law are deliberately left out of the 
scope of this study. This being said, below are a few examples meant to give an idea. 
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Is it a valid marriage if Hind, daughter of the deceased Shafi‟i Zeyd, is married by her 
full uncle „Amr to her equal Hanafi Bekir at her precedent dowry? Answer: It is.208 
 
Is Zeyd, a convert Muslim whose father is a non-Muslim, equal to Muslim Hind 
whose father is also a Muslim? Answer: He is not.
209
 
Is Zeyd, who is a Muslim but a Copt [here, probably, a gypsy], equal to Hind of the 
seyyids? Answer: He is not.
210
 
Is Zeyd, son of a freeborn father and grandfather, equal to freeborn Hind? Answer: He 
is.
211
 
Is the free „Amr, Zeyd‟s former slave, equal to freeborn Hind? Answer: He is not. 212 
 
 
The criteria other than religion and freedom comprise a significant part of the fatwa 
compilations, providing us with invaluable clues regarding how socioeconomic inequalities 
and the social hierachy were maintained through marriage. It seems that, with some 
variations according to positions and means, all Ottoman subjects were concerned with 
marriage due to its socio-economic connotations.  
 
 
 
III.2.1. Economic Status 
 
 
While other aspects of marriage equality provide us with considerable means to 
trace the effect of status on marriage, none would be as indicative as wealth and occupation 
in terms of demonstrating the Ottoman class awareness. As Meriwether argues, marriage 
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had nothing or little to do with love; instead, it was the socioeconomic concerns of families 
which were influential on spouse choices.
213
 Accordingly, our sources strongly suggest that 
material interests of families took precedence over personal preferences of prospective 
grooms and brides.  
There is not a shadow of a doubt that elite families were much more concerned 
about social, economic and political standing of the prospective spouses for their daughters 
or sons not only to solidify or strengthen their overall standing but also to avoid marriages 
that might place them in the lower echelons of the power and influence scale. To phrase it 
differently, it was not only the incentive of acquisition but also the fear of losing their 
existing ground that determined families‟ fine tooth combing of spouse selection. As a 
result, the poor and people of lower status were excluded from elites‟ possible spouse pool.  
 
Is the poor Zeyd, who is not a learned man or a notable and also not capable of paying 
bride money and alimony, equal to the rich Hind? Answer: He is not.
214
 
 
Is Zeyd, who is incapable of paying prenuptial support and maintenance, equal to 
Hind? Answer: He is not.
215
 
 
 
In a sense, wealth or high status could be a handicap for women in the matter of 
spouse selection due to the concerns of elite families about socioeconomic standing of the 
prospective spouses. In other words, elite women were bounded by more rigid rules while 
the poor were subjected to more relaxed rules regarding marriage equality. In tandem with 
this, the jurists seemed not to be uncomfortable with the possibility of unequal marriages if 
the woman was poor, that is to say, no threat arose to the social order in such cases. 
Otherwise, the criteria seemed to be strictly implemented for the stability of social order. 
For instance, women of lower socio-economic status could be married off by their 
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neighbors or by people other than their guardians while women of higher status could be 
married only by their guardians in default of which the marriage would be annulled.
216
 
 
If Hind marries to the poor Bekir from among seyyids without permission of her father 
wealthy Zeyd who is from among judges, can Zeyd have the marriage in question 
dissolved by the decision of the judge on the ground that Bekir is not equal to Hind 
due to his being incapable of providing Hind with none of the prenuptial support, 
maintenance and cloth? Answer: He can.
217
 
 
 
As manifested in the last example, even the descendants of the prophet Muhammad, 
a very prestigious social position as already mentioned, does not make an exception in 
terms of not satisfying these requirements. For family well-being and preserving marriage 
continuity, on which the Islamic law set a great value, a certain degree of material means 
were required on the men‟s end. Men had to be capable of providing their wives with the 
bride price (mehr), maintenance (nafaka) and cloth (kisve) in default of which the marriage 
could dissolve.
218
 Since it is the responsibility of men in the Islamic law to provide his 
family‟s subsistence on grounds that women should keep themselves out of foreign men‟s 
sight as much as possible, men incapable of paying prenuptial support and providing their 
wives with basic subsistence (mainly food and cloth) are not eligible for marrying any 
women, regardless of the latter‟s socio-economic status, even those of lower economic 
status.
219
 
The initial phase of setting economic equality between the partners was to 
determine the bride price (the money or goods the groom provided the bride, and 
unsurprisingly it notably varied according to the parties‟ socioeconomic standing. At this 
point, the relevant term for our purposes and much more telling regarding socioeconomic 
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standing is mehr-i misli, literally means “bride money of equal amount.” The law left the 
duty of determining the amount of the dowry to the involved parties and, consequently, the 
Ottomans took as reference the amount of dowry paid to bride sides of similar 
socioeconomic status. In other words, mehr-i misli was directly determined by social class. 
Related to this, men needed to satisfy not only the amount brides‟ standing required but 
also had to abide by the social expectations attached to the men‟s status. In other words, 
“the better-off families in particular felt pressured to bargain for high dowers, to lavish 
sizable settlements on them as a way of attracting bids from men of good status, and to 
spend heavily on the festivities”.220 The following fatwas are important in their emphasis 
on the link between the amount of the mehr and the social standing of the involved parties. 
In the first fatwa, the mufti expresses clearly his disapproval of the lower bride price on the 
grounds that such a low amount clashes with the „glory‟ of the person in question. It is also 
important that the mufti‟s solution regarding determining mehr-i misli emphasizes social 
expectations attached to the people‟s standing: the „glory‟ of the person, the social class to 
which the person belonged were emphasized while the duty of determining amounts was 
given to the knowledgeable people who were expected to know what amount was required 
for what class. 
 
Hind, the freed concubine of an agha, who was the previous Pasha of Algeria, and the 
wife of Hayreddin Pasha‟s son Hasan Pasha, applies to the court claiming “my 
marriage contract is worthy of one thousand gold”, and producing a deed (hüccet) in 
order to refute the opposition of the heirs of her deceased husband who claim that “the 
marriage contract in question is worthy of ten dirham silver”. Given that the deed in 
question is in Algeria and cannot be presented in Istanbul since a long time has 
elapsed, can Hind get ten thousand gold pieces by presenting the deed in Algeria? 
Answer: She can get it provided that the amount is in keeping with her mehr-i misli 
and the witness testimonies are transmitted to Istanbul. However, a marriage contract 
worthy of ten dirham clashes with the glory of the deceased Hasan Agha.
221
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Thusly, to whose mehr-i misli should that of Hind be legally compared? Answer: The 
knowledgeable people should determine and agree on an amount that complies with 
the glory of Hasan Agha.
222
 
 
If they were of a notable socioeconomic position in society, individuals were 
willing to reflect their status into marriage contracts in accordance with the social 
expectations. Accordingly, the amount of mehr could reach exorbitant levels as the 
following fatwa exemplifies. In a sense, the high mehrs guaranteed elite women‟s 
economic liberty during marriage and after marriage in case of divorce.
223
 Considering the 
amount of the mehr we can assume that the groom was an important person in society 
although no sign of status or title is given: 
 
Zeyd dies after contracting with Hind a marriage for a mehr of one hundred loads of 
musk, one hundreds loads of saffron; each of them equal to 30 batman, one hundred 
male slaves, one hundred concubines and one hundred camels. In this case, can the 
heirs of Zeyd pay nothing more than Hind‟s mehr-i misli? Answer: They can because 
the amount is not clear.
224
 
 
 
Status was important also in determining the domestic responsibilities of the wife in 
marriage. According to Zembilli Ali, if the woman was from among the notable families, 
she should not be forced to cook.
225
 Breast feeding also exemplified the varying 
responsibilities of women according to socioeconomic status. For rich and elite women, 
employing wet nurses was a common practice: “it was health reasons and a desire to 
maintain their figure or to shorten the interval between pregnancies that made them 
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avoiding the trouble of breastfeeding”.226 While a rich woman could take the advantage of 
having someone feed her baby instead, women of lower economic status had to feed their 
babies on their own.
227
 
Marital responsibilities remained in effect in the event of divorce too. Various 
payments were required to be paid by man to his ex-wife including a one-year alimony, 
‘idda support228, a possible compensation (muta’)229, the late and due portions of the bride 
money, and any arrears in payments of support and clothing.
230
 However, if the woman 
was the party who initiated the action for divorce, she had to forfeit any financial right 
arising from divorce. This means that it would not be a reasonable choice for a woman who 
had no financial guarantee on her own to lose her husband‟s financial support and 
protection. Thus, we can mention the difference between high status women and law status 
women in terms of their chances to ask for a consensual divorce (khul’); that is, women 
who could secure a big trousseau given by her family and a big dowry by her husband 
should have been less worried with regards to losing financial support of her husband.
231
 
Materiality of these payments to our discussion lies in their determination according to 
social status of the involved parties. For instance, fatwas from Zembilli Ali determined the 
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amount of alimony on the basis of economic status: two müdd232for the rich, one and a half 
müdd for the middling and one müdd for the poor.233 Such a difference on the basis of 
social class seems to have two main purposes: on the one hand, it seeks to accomplish 
economic equality between partners, and on the other, it aims to enable elite women to 
maintain the living standards that they were used to in their family home.  
 
 
 
III.2.2. Occupational Status 
 
 
All the material concerns and class-conscious spouse choices mentioned up to here 
were strongly connected with occupational status. According to a report, Abu Hanifa is 
said to have been unconcerned with occupational equality. However, Fetava-yı Hindiyye 
disregards the accuracy this report. Instead, it internalizes another report attributed to Abu 
Hanifa, posing a hierarchy among occupations, in which vets, practitioners of cupping, 
linen-weavers, tanners, barbers and garbage men were not equal to daughters or sisters of 
people in prestigious occupations such as linen drapery or money changing. If marriage 
partners were relatives, however, equality in occupation could be ignored.
234
 Halebi repeats 
the same prestige and income-based division among occupations, and adds woolen drapers 
and blacksmiths to the category of lower status occupations while perfumers and mercers 
are included among occupations of higher status.
235
 Fatwas from Ibn Abidin provide us 
with a chance to construct a more or less generic classification of occupations in relation to 
marriage equality. Accordingly, the upper strata consisted of the members of religious 
institution (‘ilmiyye) such as judges and scholars; the middle strata was composed of 
tailors, perfumers, linen drapers, money changers, mercers; the lower strata included 
members of various professions such as stablemen, shepherds, tanners, bath attendants, 
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vets, practitioners of cupping, linen-weavers, barbers and garbage men.
236
 Local variations 
brought considerable differences in terms of the prestige and income of various 
occupations, for instance, a weaver could be equal to a perfumer in Alexandria, Abidin 
says.
237
 What placed some occupations among lower status occupations was whether they 
required close contact with dirty substances such as garbage, animal skin, or animal itself. 
These occupations in a sense were dealt by “outcasts”. Moreover, sellers were not 
considered of lower status according to the substances of the goods they sold. For instance, 
although shoemaking had a stigma, shoe-sellers were free from any negative social 
perception.
238
 
As already argued, one of the main divisions in the Ottoman society was between 
the knowledgeable and ignorant. Related to this, it has also been shown that knowledge 
was highly respected in the writings of the Ottoman literati. This prestige attached to 
knowledge revealed itself in the placement of the Ulama in the higher echelons of the 
occupational hierarchy as well. Although the positions of the people in the religious 
institution were specified in some instances in fatwa compilations such as preacher, 
teacher, judge etc., regarding the fatwas related to the principle of marriage equality, the 
inscription of “from among the Ulama” (Ulema’dan olan...) was applied to all members of 
the „ilmiyye, without specifying the particular positions they held in the „ilmiyye, which 
indeed contained in itself many occupations differing greatly in terms of income and 
prestige as well as political influence. Judging by our fatwas, knowledge was preferred by 
the muftis to material wealth. In a sense, as they owed their prestigious position to the 
political and cultural importance attached to knowledge, the muftis emphasized superiority 
of knowledge vis-a-vis material wealth. Accordingly, practitioners of ordinary occupations 
were not regarded to be equal to the daughters of the members of the Ulama under any 
circumstances. The following fatwas should illustrate how that worked: 
 
Can „Amr give his daughter Hind of Muslim in marriage to the rich Bekir against her 
will while Zeyd, a man of knowledge, have made his proposal and sent a sum of 
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prenuptial support already? Answer: It is beneath Muslims to prefer someone else to 
the men of knowledge.
239
 
 
What happens to „Amr if he still prefers Bekir to Zeyd on the ground that Zeyd is 
poor? Answer: Knowledge of Zeyd is better than the other‟s wealth, knowledge 
should be preferred.
240
 
 
Is the ignorant „Amr a member of the grocers‟ guild equal to Hind whose father Zeyd 
is among from the Ulama. Answer: He is not.
241
 
If the righteous Hind whose father is from the Ulama marries her unequal Bekir 
without the permission of her guardian „Amr, who is Hind‟s full brother, can „Amr 
separate Hind from Bekir by the decision of judge? Answer: He can.
242
 
 
 
 
III.2.3. Moral Status 
 
 
At the very least, families were concerned with having moral and well-behaved 
partners for their daughters. In this regard, fatwas are full of the epithets associated with 
moral standings of people. Some epithets such as fasık (impious), facir (dissolute), 
müdmin-i hamr (wine addict), cahil (ignorant) and rezil (disreputable) are the most 
commonly encountered ones in the fatwas concerning marriage equality in terms of piety 
and morality. It comes as no surprise that the people characterized as such were not 
considered as proper partners for the moral and pious women deemed to be defined with 
complimentary epithets like salihe (righteous), muhaddere (virtuous), or mümeyyize 
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(qualified). The examples below show the concerns of parents or guardians who want to 
obtain a fatwa in favor of their effort to prevent unfavorable marriages. 
 
Is the sinner Zeyd equal to righteous Hind, daughter of righteous „Amr? Answer: He is 
not.
243
 
 
Is ignorant and wine addict „Amr equal to Hind, daughter of the righteous and learned 
Zeyd? Answer: He is not.
244
 
 
 
In many instances similar to those fatwas above, parents or guardians presented their 
worries at the initial phase with the hope of eliminating the possibility of inappropriate 
marriages their daughters might fall for. Most probably because of the already mentioned 
difficulty in measuring the moral status, some marriages ended up between unequal 
spouses (The other possibilities may be the groom‟s being from a different town or his 
being away from his hometown for a long time and, consequently, remained out of the 
society‟s sight). In such cases, as far as stated in the queries, the groom or the people that 
knew him deceived the bride side about the former‟s moral status and behaviors and, 
consequently, the marriage was conducted. Keeping in line with Islamic doctrine, the 
Muftis almost always handed down an opinion in favor of the bride‟s side, either to the 
guardians or to the woman herself, allowing them annul the marriage. The same also 
applied to cases in which women married themselves to someone their guardians 
disapproved.  
 
Being said that Zeyd is an innocuous and righteous person and without knowing his 
immorality, parental guardians of the righteous Hind give her, with her consent, in 
marriage to Zeyd. Given that Zeyd had sexual intercourse with Hind, can the 
guardians of Hind have the marriage in question dissolved by the decision of the judge 
on the basis of Zeyd‟s immorality? Answer: They can.245 
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When Zeyd asks for the little Hind, who is the daughter of righteous „Amr, in 
marriage, „Amr marries his daughter to Zeyd in regard to some people‟ saying that 
Zeyd is righteous and pious. However, after marriage, it becomes obvious that Zeyd is 
wine addict. In this case, can Hind have her marriage dissolved by the judge after 
reaching puberty? Answer: She can
246
 
When Amr asks for minor Hind in marriage, her father righteous Zeyd accedes his 
demand since he supposes that „Amr is righteous. If it becomes obvious during the 
marriage that „Amr is dissolute and wine addict, can Hind apply to the judge to have 
her marriage dissolved after reaching puberty? Answer: She can.
247
 
 
 
This being said, the question arises as to whether it is possible to measure the 
morality, and who decided the moral standing of people according to what criteria? It can 
be assumed that some points were easier to observe and can be used to support or negate 
people‟s moral standing; for instance, performing the daily prayers was essential to be a 
good Muslim while attending wine houses might signal bad morality. However, not all 
behaviors or habits are that clear in terms of their moral connotations; the chances are 
limited to define unambiguously whether a person is really deviant or moral. This 
confusion necessarily brings mind the possibility that these blurred definitions and 
measuring-difficulty of morality and moral behavior enabled at least some guardians to get 
rid of unwanted men for any reason both in marriages or legal matters such as testimony, 
which has already been discussed.  
Related to this, as already argued in the previous chapters, morality and immorality 
were not decided independently of the socioeconomic hierarchy. Moreover, the stigmas 
related to immorality did not always correspond to the actual conduct of people. Rather, in 
many instances, socioeconomic hierarchy was likely to be at work: while fatwa 
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compilations have many instances in which people of lower status are associated with 
immorality, no match between people of higher status and immorality or ignorance is 
present. It should also be added that, as noted before, the people who vouched for one‟s 
morality or had the right to comment on one‟s immorality were the notables of the 
neighborhoods or towns who acted in collaboration with the state officials, for example, to 
maintain safety and order.  
 
 
 
III.3. Religious Ideal or Social Reality: Historiography on Ottoman Marriage 
Patterns 
 
 
Having presented relevant fatwas regarding the relationship between marriage and 
the maintenance of social boundaries and inequalities, one issue still remains unclear: to 
what degree fatwas can be regarded as the mirror of reality? Were they religious ideals far 
from reality? At this point, the findings of studies in this direction can be of avail. Some 
related pieces from the relevant literature, especially court records based studies, of course 
with inevitable variations, confirm the socioeconomic concerns attached to marriage.
248
 
We do not need to look far in order to see how strategically marriage was used in 
the Ottoman world: although a dynasty cannot be regarded as the representative of society, 
a look at the Ottoman dynasty‟s marriage strategies can be of avail to understand the 
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(nakibülesraf kaymakamı)”, and “Osman the rose water maker (gülab) who is a 
shoemaker (this suggests that rose water maker is his family name) and servant of 
someone else, from among the dissolute and spendthrift people (süfehâ-i nas), and 
also known for his being disgraceful and vile”. This „dead born‟ marriage, 
contadicting with almost all concerns of status that were in effect in marriage 
contracts, was dissolved by the judge. İsmail Kıvrım, “17. Yüzyılda Osmanlı 
Toplumunda Boşanma Hadiseleri (Ayıntâb Örneği; Talâk, Muhâla„a ve Tefrîk),” 
Gaziantep Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 10:1(2011): 371 – 400. 
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importance of marriage as a multi-functional tool used at every segment of the Ottoman 
world. There has been a lot written on the Ottoman dynasty‟s strategies in its early 
centuries among which marriage was frequently used as an instrument to secure political 
alliances.
249
 From the 17th century onwards, this strategy from previous centuries came 
into prominence in a different form in which the Ottoman sultanas were married off to 
notable Vizier and pashas. At the first glance, this can be regarded as the sultan‟s favor to 
the grandees, providing them with the privilege of being a part of the dynastic family, with 
the epithet of damad (groom) added in front of their names. However, it is now much more 
obvious that such marriages were of mutual benefit as they enabled the Ottoman sultans to 
have a have better control over the grandees, especially 17
th
 century onwards when 
Ottoman Vizier-pasha households started to enjoy greater authority in politics.
250
 This 
tendency continued all through the 18
th
 century which is considered as the “heyday of the 
politics of households”, in Kenneth Kuno‟s terms.251 
The other segments of the Ottoman world were not very different from their ruling 
family in terms of their perception of marriage, if in different ways. It has been suggested 
in a recent study dealing with the relationship between marriage and status to classify 
marriages into three general groups in relation to the parties involved in: endogamy 
(marriages among identical socioeconomic groups), homogamy (marriages among similar 
socioeconomic groups) and heterogamy (marriages among dissimilar socioeconomic 
groups).
252
 Our conclusions from the fatwas, which point to the relative rarity of 
heterogamy while suggesting a higher degree of endogamy and homogamy, are supported 
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by the court record findings. Scholars dwelling on court records have found high rates of 
intramarriage among the elites. Judging by the existing historiography, although it changes 
from one place to another whether marriages occur among elites of the same profession, 
i.e. military title holders and religious title holders, or among elites with different titles, the 
general trend seems to be that elites did not to marry down. To put it differently, intraelite 
marriages were “as much an alliance or partnership as strategic alignments and power-
sharing arrangements common among male grandees”.253 
Whether to marry in or marry outside the household seemed to depend on the 
families‟ overall socioeconomic standing. In her observations for Aleppo, Meriwether 
points out a crucial pattern in which “upwardly mobile families were much more likely to 
marry outside family since they needed to establish alliances with as many different 
families as they could”.254 Keeping possible variations in mind, this model can be though 
to have appeared in many cities or regions of the Ottoman world. Marrying into poor 
families was likely to be very rare among old established families or families looking for 
ways of upward mobility, which suggests that the main difference was between the lower 
classes and upper classes while marriages were possible between higher and lower elites. 
Not only economic capital but also cultural and social capitals were of great importance, 
consequently, the descendants of the Prophet and members of the Ulama could make their 
ways into elite families through family ties of mutual benefit. While elite families provided 
them with the chance of upward mobility, the prestigious sociocultural position of the latter 
were of equal importance for elites to solidify their social standing, especially acquiring 
kinship ties with the prophet‟s descendants, a status that could be acquired through female 
members of the descendants of the Prophet. However, nothing motivated higher status 
families to have ties with lower status families: the latter offered no networks, no prestige, 
and no economic capital to the former. 
These two strategies –marrying in the household in order to keep assets together, 
and marrying into families of similar, or if possible better, socioeconomic status in search 
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of establishing ties and alliances– are well-documented in sicil-based studies. As Ergene 
mentions, in 18
th
-century Kastamonu, marriages among title holders and the titleless were 
very unlikely, suggesting a strong socioeconomic barrier between these two broad groups. 
Although one encounters marriages between titleholders and titleless people, those who 
married down are holders of most humble titles, in terms of their possible socioeconomic 
advantages.
255
 For 18
th
-century Egypt, Hathaway draws our attention to the marriage 
alliances among Egyptian military households in which both women and men acquired a 
notable degree of wealth, political influence and social prestige. The women married to a 
grandee could enjoy certain advantages, especially if the grandee in question had no male 
heirs, while the same was true for men who acquired the dowry and other property of well-
to-do women through marriage.
256
 17-th century Sofia and 18-th century Nablus exhibit 
similar features concerning intraelite marriages. In Sofia, the highest military title holders, 
ağas, almost exclusively intermarried257 while the well-known merchant family of Nablus, 
Arafats, preferred cousin marriage, with the purpose of preventing the family assets to 
disperse. The findings of Ze‟evi for Jerusalem do not differ much in terms of the marriage 
alliances among the elite. He demonstrates the marriages between the Farrukhs and the 
Ridwans, two important old-established families. The general tendency of marriages based 
on hierarchy repeated itself in Jerusalem as well. Here, too, a strict line divided the 
privileged notables and the unprivileged rest.
258
 
According to court records, marriages among the Ulama, the descendants of the 
Prophet, and military men were the most common way acquiring ties and networks. Barbir 
argues that through such marriages military men acquired the title of seyyid which could be 
passed through females, and these marriages also enabled elites to have peace by pacifying 
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factional conflicts that were chronic in the Damascene society.
259
 Being from the 
descendants of the Prophet enabled people enjoy certain advantages including the chance 
of upward mobility through marriage.
260
 Although not as influential as members of the 
military class or the Ulama, seyyids were ideal spouses for the families who were keen on 
adding a new ring to their chain of prestige. Variations in this tendency were possible. 
Damascene ulama
261
 and Sofian ulama
262
 seemed to be much more concerned with 
intramarriages rather than marrying out while Aleppo presents a completely different 
picture in which the Ulama families time and again forged marriage alliances with the 
families of merchants and military ranks.
263
 Interestingly, ulama of Istanbul followed both 
ways: while the highest ranking Ulama strictly followed endogamy, the middle to high 
ranking the Ulama could frequently marry off non-Ulama families.
264
 However, the ulama 
of Istanbul, too, did not tend to marry down. While people of different professions could 
intermarry, such as marriages among sheiks and merchant families, the main gap appeared 
to be between the poor and the wealthy, the intermarriage of whom was really rare.
265
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Conclusion 
 
 
In the Ottoman Empire, spouse selection was a matter of great importance due to its 
direct influence on the status of both spouses‟ families. Marriage had a meaning beyond 
individual preference or decision. At the exact center of the everyday life, marriage was 
among the most important ways to forge alliances, access networks, and seize a chance of 
mobility. Given this important link, parents got involved in almost every stage of the 
marriage, and perhaps, the spouse selection was the most important stage among all. Most 
of the time, families appeared as the sole decision maker in spouse selection, leaving none 
or limited room for the free will of the prospective groom and bride. Taking the support of 
the legally and traditionally sanctioned rules and expectations behind them, families did 
not shy away from actively intervening in the process. 
Social reality was not different from what was reflected in the fatwas: most 
marriages appear between families of similar status in terms of wealth, power and prestige. 
Studies dealing with marriages in Ottoman society confirm the situation as the examples 
and patterns offered in them prove the existence of a strong link between status concerns 
and spouse selection. Studies on marriage and patterns of marriage in the Ottoman Empire 
indicate that marriages were not arranged independently from material concerns of families 
which looked for social alliances and new power networks for themselves. Cultural capital 
in many instances was transformed into economic capital. Despite the absence of a 
deterrent to men to marry lower women of lower status, endogamy and homogamy were 
very common while heterogamy was not widespread. This phenomenon allows us to 
conclude that marriage was not a personal choice that depended on individual‟s 
preferences but rather, it was influenced by families‟ expectations. In a sense, the principle 
of equality in marriage can be regarded as the social reflection of the Ottoman political 
discourse of “yerlü yeründe”, which means to keep people in their own place within the 
socio-political hierarchy –a motto that was commonly repeated by the Ottoman elite and 
intellectuals. Through the boundaries between the elite members of the Ottoman society 
and the ones who did not have a much wealth and prestige, marriage served as a 
mechanism to maintain the existing order. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I have tried to show the link between socioeconomic status and legal 
status of Ottoman individuals through fatwas, one of the least studied sources of Ottoman 
history, from 16
th
 to 18
th
 centuries. To this end, the extent to which Ottoman individuals 
drew certain identity components to the muftis‟ attention and the ways in which the stated 
identity components affected the muftis‟ responses have been examined. The well-defined 
categories of Islamic law –women, dhimmis, and slaves- and the inequalities stemming 
from the disadvantageous position of the members of these categories against free Muslim 
men have been deliberately left out of the scope of this study. Rather, the focus has been on 
the status components which were not resorted to as criteria to determine legal status of 
individuals in the canon of the Islamic law but became an integral part of the legal culture 
as a result of the interaction between law and custom –such as occupation, wealth, lineage, 
knowledge etc. Stated in other words, only the hierarchies and inequalities that became a 
part of the Islamic law as a result of the contact between the Islamic law and custom have 
been emphasized for the purposes of this study. 
In the first chapter, the relationship between socioeconomic status of individuals and 
their legal credibility has been examined with reference to the fatwas regarding who were 
eligible to give legal testimony. Again, various criteria of assessing legal competence such 
as age, gender, sanity etc. have been disregarded in favor of socioeconomic characteristics 
of individuals such as occupation, knowledge, wealth and so on. At times directly, and at 
other times indirectly, the fatwas in this chapter have suggested that legal credibility and 
socioeconomic status largely overlapped. In other words, the place of the individuals in the 
scale of credibility was directly related to their position in the echelons of social hierachy. 
To be more precise, reliability of people of high status was self-evident while people of 
lower status were frequently associated with ignorance, dissoluteness or impiety, thereby 
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deemed ineligible to give legal testimony. The high degree of correlation between the 
fatwas presented in this chapter and ideas of the Ottoman elite writers in terms of the sharp 
contrasts between the elite and the common people, the scholar and the ignorant, and the 
practitioners of high status occupations (exclusively the occupations that were reserved for 
the askeri class) and those of lower status occupations has also been among the salient 
observations of this chapter. This correlation is important as it shows the overlap between 
concerns regarding the integrity of the social order and the attitude of the muftis, which 
will be further discussed later in this part. In general, the link between socioeconomic 
status and legal credibility that this chapter suggests are supported by findings of scholars 
of pre-Ottoman Islamic history and Ottoman history alike. For the pre-Ottoman period, 
Hallaq
266
 and Johansen
267
 convincingly show the interaction between socioeconomic status 
of the individuals and their legal status which is evident from the fact that the ones who 
constituted the pool of just witnesses were mostly from among elites. As for the Ottoman 
context, findings of Canbakal
268
 and Ergene
269
 point to the elite hegemony on the 
testimonial process. They argue that in addition to undertaking various duties in the court, 
elites monopolized this aspect of the legal process to the degree that it was the same people 
who appeared as witnesses in different cases. 
In the second chapter, it has been argued regarding the ta’zir punishments that the 
socioeconomic status of the offenders was among the criteria used by muftis to determine 
the severity of the punishment. Put differently, punishments for the same crimes varied 
according to the offenders‟ position in the society. In this regard, the Ulama were not 
sentenced to ta’zir. The reason for this was the derogatory feature of ta’zir which was 
generally implemented in the form of bastinado or other ways of beating variably by whip, 
stick or hand. Armed with the legitimacy of central roles in the Ottoman polity as the 
guardians of religion and the heirs of the Prophet as imposed by Islamic culture, the Ulama 
were granted immunity from such a derogatory punishment, which would have injured, if 
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applied, not only the prestige of the Ulama but also one of the main pillars of the Ottoman 
polity. Instead, when engaged in an inappropriate act, the members of the Ulama were 
informed of their impropriety and asked not to repeat the acts in question. The balance 
between severity of the punishment and the socioeconomic status of the offender was not 
limited to the case of the Ulama; fatwas reveal a much more systematic framework in this 
regard. Accordingly, ta’zir of notables was said to involve having them come to the office 
of the judge while ta’zir of middle class people was imprisonment and ta’zir of lower class 
people was beating. Socioeconomic status mattered also in determining whether an act 
required ta’zir punishment; that is, some acts such as simple revilements were considered 
punishable only if the aggrieved party occupied an important position in the society. In this 
chapter, seyyids‟ advantageous legal position has also been examined with reference to 
both their immunity from ta’zir and the muftis‟ sensitivity towards the punishment of the 
offenders who besmirched seyyids‟ dignity. Regarding the seyyids‟ advantageous position 
too, the state‟s legitimacy concerns seem to have played a decisive role. As Canbakal 
argues, “although the Ottoman state- builders did not claim Muhammadan pedigree 
themselves, they did promote the cult of Muhammadan nobility as part of their self-
image.”270 This too suggests that the advantageous positions of some groups in the 
Ottoman world were in accordance with the state‟s legitimacy concerns, most evident in 
the cases of the Ulama and seyyids. The last point discussed in this chapter was muhaddere 
(veiled, honorable woman). It has been argued that the issue of seclusion, which was the 
prerequisite to qualify the status of muhaddere, was a matter of class. Stated in other 
words, elite women had far greater chances to fulfill the requirements of principle of 
seclusion not only by their ability to hire servants accompanying them in public and 
running errands but also by the facilities of elite houses with properly enclosed courtyards, 
private baths, wells and fountains, each enabled the women to meet their various need 
without mixing with the public. Enjoying greater chances, the elite women could establish 
their status as muhaddere. Once their status was established as muhaddere, the elite women 
could refuse to appear in the court in person when they were summoned. 
In the third chapter, the focus has been on the reflections of the Islamic principle of 
marriage equality in fatwas. Through an examination of the various criteria that the muftis 
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proposed with respect to the equality between partners, it has been argued that the kafa’a 
principle contributed and reinforced the safety of the existing social hierachy. Considering 
the criteria proposed, little room was allowed for social mobility. On the contrary, the 
marriages between partners of similar socioeconomic status were encouraged. In that 
sense, the marriage patterns prescribed in the rulings of the muftis were on the same 
wavelength with the exhortation by Ottoman literati towards preserving the existing social 
hierarchy by keeping people in their proper place. It goes without saying that marriage was 
a social and economic contract, and as such, both families and partners were pretty much 
concerned with each other‟s socioeconomic status. In this regard, families were much more 
concerned with the socioeconomic conditions of the prospective spouses for their children 
and thus took active part in the marriage process at every stage. Judging by the fatwas used 
in this chapter, wealth, occupation, knowledge and piety prove to be decisive for men to 
measure up to their partners. Since the party that was required to measure up to the other 
was men, he had to be capable of providing his wife with basic subsistence such as food, 
clothing, and housing. Men who were incapable of providing these were not considered 
equal to even the poor women. In this connection, marriages served the elite in a way to 
manifest their social status as evident in the high amount of dowries that wealthy families 
paid. Both fatwas and sicil-based studies permit us to argue that marriages between the 
members of similar socioeconomic status groups were much more common compared to 
those between people of different socioeconomic status. Through the relevant sicil-based 
studies, it has been shown that many marriages were contracted between the members of 
the same household in order to keep the wealth of the household from dispersing or 
between partners of similar status to forge profitable alliances. Of great importance, it has 
also been argued through findings of the studies in question that not only economic capital 
but also social capital could be a concern in marriage; that is, marriage alliances between 
wealthy families and member of socially prestigious groups such as the Ulama and seyyids 
were common.  
I would like to present some concluding remarks related to the functions and legal 
status of fatwas, the muftis‟ identity as well as the interaction between law and practice. 
The sources consulted in this study point to the interplay between law and practice. On the 
one hand, this study has shown the instances in which law reflects social practices. Thus, it 
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seems that customs and various aspects of social hierarchy were reflected in fatwas. Put 
differently, socioeconomic structure, power relations and cultural patterns found an echo 
both in the inquiries posed to the muftis and their responses. On the other hand, it has also 
been argued through the relevant secondary literature that social practice also reflects law. 
In this connection, it has been observed that the legal responses of the muftis and findings 
of the sicil-based studies overlap to a considerable extent. It has been argued that fatwas 
were used more commonly in legal processes from the 17th century onwards.
271
 Indeed, 
fatwas were legally non-binding. In practice, however, fatwa occupied an important place 
in the lives of Ottoman individuals not only as a manual to follow the religiously right path 
but also as documents to support their demands in the court.  
Secondly, I have observed that fatwas of the Ottoman şeyhülislams from 16th to 18th 
centuries conform to the rules of pre-Ottoman Islamic law with regard to marriage 
equality, elite‟s legal credibility as well as their immunity to some certain punishments. At 
this point, the question arises as to how we should interpret such a consistency between the 
Ottoman fatwas from the period in question and pre-Ottoman Islamic law? This question 
can be answered with reference to two dynamics. The first one is that, as already argued, 
both pre-Ottoman Islamic law and Ottoman law came into terms with customs and the 
existing social structure and consequently customs and social structure infiltrated into and 
became an integral part of the law.  
In some instances, however, in accordance with the actual political needs of the 
Ottoman state, Ottoman şeyhülislams issued fatwas inconsistent with pre-Ottoman Islamic 
law. For a case in point, we can mention the fatwas by Ebussuud Efendi during the 
ongoing rivalry in the 16th century between the Sunni Ottomans and Shiite Safavids 
whereby he legitimized war against a Muslim empire. Although not inconsistent with 
Islamic law, we have some other instances in which fatwas served the agenda of the 
Ottoman state such as fatwas by Yenişehirli Abdullah Efendi regarding the official 
introduction of the printing press in the Ottoman world. These examples suggest that the 
muftis toned their attitude according to needs of the central ideology. Indeed, the 
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şeyhülislam‟s office was a part of the ruling mechanism and thus, generally speaking, the 
şeyhülislams‟ rulings were in line with the demands of the central ideology. In other words, 
fatwas can be used as a basis to trace the ideology of the şeyhülislam‟s office.  
The second dynamic has to do with the identities of the writers. Both pre-Ottoman 
Muslim jurists and philosophers, and Ottoman religious and political literati whose 
writings and rulings were loyal to the existing social hierarchy were from the higher 
echelons of the society. In tandem with their identity, they underlined the need to maintain 
the stability of the social order. In a sense, fatwas reveal “the mental world of the Islamic 
intellectual elites”. At this point, the correlation between the ideas in the writings of the 
Ottoman religious and political literati seems remarkable. Related to the identity of the 
muftis, fatwas somehow functioned as a social control mechanism. In numerous examples, 
some of which are cited verbatim in this study, the punishment of the individuals whose 
acts clashed with the norms of the existing hierarchy and violated the social order was 
recommended by the muftis. At times, the muftis expressed their opinion in favor of the 
punishment of such people by ta’zir. At other times, the muftis recommended “discipline” 
(ta’dib). Both punishments were corrective in feature and not unrelated to the position of 
the offenders‟ in the social hierarchy. The intention behind such punishments was to 
remind the offenders of the limits of their status. In many other instances, the muftis stated 
the inappropriateness of certain acts in religious terms with reference not to worldly 
punishments but to the otherworldly punishments. It would not be far from the truth to 
argue that fatwas served the state as an important tool to discipline and control its 
subjects.
272
 
Lastly, the limits that have already been specified call for caution about making 
general inferences through the sources at hand. In order to reach more reliable conclusions, 
a deeper analysis based on the original manuscripts of the fatwas of Ottoman şeyhülislams 
as well as the fatwas of the muftis of the Ottoman provinces is needed. Moreover, another 
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approach deepen and widen the analysis would be to compare the tendencies reflected in 
fatwas with the data available in the courts records from a territory as wide as possible.  
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